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DECONSTRUCTING
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
DIRECTOR PRIMACY WITHOUT PRINCIPLE?
René Reich-Graefe *
Here is my secret. It’s quite simple: One sees clearly only with the
heart. Anything essential is invisible to the eyes.
—Antoine de Saint-Exupéry **

I. OPENING SKETCHES: ABSOLUTE DIRECTOR PRIMACY
For almost eighty years now, corporate law scholarship has centered around two elementary analytical findings made in what has once
been described as the “last major work of original scholarship” 1 within
the field. Since Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’ The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 2 corporate theory has first regarded the separation of ownership and control (i.e., the defining notion characterizing
the large, publicly held corporation with widely dispersed shareowner-

*

Associate Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. LL.B.,
Free University of Berlin School of Law, 1996. LL.M., University of Connecticut
School of Law, 1997. I am grateful for generous financial support from the Western
New England College School of Law and for helpful comments and support from Barbara Noah (who also made sure that I broke up and changed all of those long sentences
that each ran for an entire paragraph). All errors are mine (and any remaining singlesentence paragraphs were reinserted later due to my stubbornness).
**
THE LITTLE PRINCE 63 (Richard Howard trans., Harcourt 2000) (1943).
1. Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV.
923, 923 (1984). See also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 4-5 (2008) (describing Berle and Means’ The
Modern Corporation and Private Property as “what still may be the most influential
book ever written about corporations”).
2. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
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ship) 3 as the “master problem for research.” 4 As a second analytical inquiry, it has designated the resultant problem of affecting control over
independent corporate managers through both legal and market forces as
the fundamental agency (cost) problem of corporate law. 5

3. See id. at 84-89, 119-25. Accord FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND
PROFIT 291 (1921) (“The typical form of business unit in the modern world is the corporation. Its most important characteristic is the combination of diffused ownership with
concentrated control.”). See also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 3-5, 72
(2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter, BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW]; JAMES D. COX & THOMAS
LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 39-40 (2d ed. 2003); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director v.
Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence Debate, 16 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 45, 46 (2002)
[hereinafter Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy]; William W. Bratton, Berle
and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737, 739-40, 753-59
(2001); Oliver Hart, An Economist’s View of Fiduciary Duty, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 299,
303 n.9 (1993) [hereinafter Hart, An Economist’s View]; David Millon, Theories of the
Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 214; Charles R.T. O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur and
the Theory of the Modern Corporation, 31 J. CORP. L. 753, 754 (2006) [hereinafter
O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur]; Arthur R. Pinto, An Overview of United States Corporate
Governance in Publicly Traded Corporations, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 257, 259-60 (2010).
On the legacy of Berle and Means and their groundbreaking research, see generally
Kelli A. Alces, Revisiting Berle and Rethinking the Corporate Structure, 33 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 787 (2010); Bratton, supra; William W. Bratton, Jr. & Michael L. Wachter,
Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation,
34 J. CORP. L. 99 (2008); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Tracking Berle’s
Footsteps: The Trail of The Modern Corporation’s Last Chapter, 33 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 849 (2010); Charles R.T. O’Kelley, Berle and the Entrepreneur, 33 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 1141 (2010); Harwell Wells, The Birth of Corporate Governance, 33 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 1247 (2010).
4. Romano, supra note 1. See also BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 3,
at 3-4 (stating that “[t]he conflicts of interest created by [the] separation of ownership
and control drive much of corporate law”); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 6 (discussing
the effects of the separation of ownership and control); Alces, supra note 3, at 787 (describing the separation of ownership and control and the resultant agency cost problem
as “a central concern of the law of corporate governance”); id. at 789 (describing the
separation of ownership and control as “the defining problem facing corporate governance”); O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur, supra note 3, at 754 (stating that the “central
problem of the modern corporation” is found in its “separation of ownership and control”); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J.
FIN. 737, 740 (1997) (“The essence of the agency problem is the separation of management and finance, or – in more standard terminology – of ownership and control.”).
5. See, e.g. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 3, at 75 (“Much of corporate law is best understood as a mechanism for containing […] agency costs.”); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Team Production in Business Organizations: An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 743, 743 (1999) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, Team Production]
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The latter problem of efficient corporate control, in particular (i.e.,
that magical—if, perhaps, elusive—balance between managerial discretion and managerial accountability), 6 must be regarded, at least analytically, as “unfinished business.” Solvitur ambulando, 7 we have certainly
made good progress “stumbl[ing] forwards in our empirical fashion” 8
(describing the agency cost problem of monitoring managers and motivating them to act
as faithful agents as “the central economic problem to be faced in a public corporation”
for those following the principal-agent model of the firm); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn
A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1807 (2001) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, Trustworthiness];
Phillip I. Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Social Crisis, 50 B.U. L. REV.
157, 177 (1970); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal
Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH 21, 22 (2004); Marcel Kahan, The Limited Significance of Norms for Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1877-78 (2001); Millon, supra note 3, at
221; Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law,
Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1624 (2001);
Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 4, at 740-48 (discussing the agency problem as the central problem of corporate governance). See also Rudolf Richter, The New Institutional
Economics: Its Start, Its Meaning, Its Prospects, 6 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 161, 179
(2005) (stating that the central problem of Williamsonian transaction cost economics is
ex-post opportunism).
6. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 207 (2002) [hereinafter BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS] (“Establishing the proper
mix of discretion and accountability […] emerges as the central corporate governance
question.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 84 (2004) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Abstention Doctrine];
Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. LAW. 461, 524-25
(1992); Darian M. Ibrahim, Individual or Collective Liability for Corporate Directors,
93 IOWA L. REV. 929, 947-48 (2008); Pinto, supra note 3, at 266; Shleifer & Vishny,
supra note 4, at 742-44.
7. “It is solved in walking”:
A civilian system differs from a common law system much as rationalism differs
from empiricism or deduction from induction. The civilian naturally reasons from
principles to instances, the common lawyer from instances to principles. The civilian puts his faith in syllogisms, the common lawyer in precedents; the first silently
asking himself as each new problem arises, “What should we do this time?” and
the second asking aloud in the same situation, “What did we do last time?” . . . The
instinct of the civilian is to systematize. The working rule of the common lawyer
is solvitur ambulando.

Thomas Mackay Cooper, The Common Law and the Civil Law—A Scot’s View, 63
HARV. L. REV. 468, 470–71 (1950).
8. Frederic W. Maitland, Outlines of English Legal History, 560-1600, in II THE
COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 438–39 (H.A.L. Fisher ed.,
1911). Maitland famously characterized the methodological approach of the English
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and have been successful at developing a good number of insightful and
valuable microtheoretical 9 models of the firm 10 but, as I have analyzed

common law as follows:
King Henry and his able ministers came just in time––a little later would have
been too late: English law would have been unified, but it would have been Romanised. We have been wont to boast, perhaps too loudly of the pure ‘Englishry’ of
our common law. This has not been all pure gain. Had we ‘received’ the Roman
jurisprudence as our neighbours received it, we should have kept out of many a
bad mess through which we have plunged. But to say nothing of the political side
of the matter, of the absolute monarchy which Roman law has been apt to bring in
its train, it is probably well for us and for the world at large that we have stumbled
forwards in our empirical fashion, blundering into wisdom.

Id. (emphasis added). See also RAINER MARIA RILKE, RILKE ON LOVE AND OTHER
DIFFICULTIES 25 (John L. Mood, trans., W.W. Norton 1975) (“Do not now seek the answers, which cannot be given you because you would not be able to live them. And the
point is, to live everything. Live the questions now. Perhaps you will then gradually,
without noticing it, live along some distant day into the answer.”).
9. Microtheoretical models of the firm focus on the internal cohesion, adaptability
and survival of the firm as a generator and maximizer of productive output and economic wealth and, thus, largely ignore distributive concerns—namely, whether the externalized costs of generating and maximizing economic wealth are fairly/effectively distributed and whether the resultant economic wealth itself is fairly/effectively distributed.
Cf. William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1395, 1396 (1993); Millon, supra note 3, at 201-02; Edward B. Rock &
Michael L. Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law: Introduction, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607,
1608 (2001).
10. The four main models in today’s academic discussion can be labeled as “shareholder primacy,” “contractarian,” “team production,” and “director primacy.” See, e.g.,
Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy, supra note 3 (discussing shareholderprimacy and director-primacy models); John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of
Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable Are U.S. Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837
(1999) (discussing team-production models); George W. Dent, Jr., Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production and Director Primacy Models of Corporate Governance, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1213 (2008) (discussing team-production and director-primacy
models); Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637 (2006) (discussing shareholder-primacy models); Ian B.
Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About Shareholder Primacy, 31 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 533 (2006) (discussing shareholder primacy and team production models); René
Reich-Graefe, Deconstructing Corporate Governance: Absolute Director Primacy, 5
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 341 (2011) (discussing all four models); J.W. Verret,
Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice, 27 YALE J.
ON REG. 283, 315-26 (2010) (discussing all four models as well as ‘agency theory’ and
‘progressive corporate law theory’). For a more general discussion of those firm models, see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation Is a Nexus of
Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819 (1999); O’Kelley, The
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in more detail elsewhere, 11 we are still a significant distance away from
fully explaining “the wisdom” that Berle and Means so thoroughly and
masterfully “blundered into.” 12 Measured by the predictive ability and
accuracy of such models 13 (i.e., their respective ability to predetermine

Entrepreneur, supra note 3; Steven M.H. Wallman, Understanding the Purpose of a
Corporation: An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 807 (1999) [hereinafter Wallman, Understanding].
11. Reich-Graefe, supra note 10.
12. See Maitland, supra note 8, at 439. See also Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of
Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 832 (2001) (“Until we discover
exactly what directors hear amidst all the noise, we cannot begin to evaluate the wisdom
of our bundle of legal and regulatory strategies touching on questions of boards of directors’ responsibilities.”) (emphasis added). For the so-called “Berle-Dodd debate”
between Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. in the wake of the Great Depression and their dialectic development of fiduciary duties and, thus accountability, of corporate managers, see Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44
HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931); E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate
Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr.,
Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?,
2 U. CHI. L. REV. 194 (1935). See generally William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 273 (1992) (discussing
the Berle-Dodd debate); William W. Bratton, Jr. & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder
Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP.
L. 99, 122-34 (2008) (same); Fisch, supra note 10, at 646-48 (same); A.A. Sommer, Jr.,
Whom Should The Corporation Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty Years
Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33 (1991); Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of the Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don’t Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your
Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 22 (2003) [hereinafter Stout, Proper Motives] (“The debate between the ‘shareholder primacy’ view and ‘stakeholder’ models of the corporation dates back at least seventy years, and it remains unresolved today.”) (footnote omitted); Joseph L. Weiner, The Berle-Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation,
64 COLUM. L. REV. 1458 (1964). In an interesting twist to today’s prevailing views on
shareholder primacy, Berle explicitly conceded defeat of his shareholder primacy model
to Dodd’s stakeholder-oriented model once A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow,
98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953), was decided. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY
CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954). See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 561 n.70
(2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Primacy].
13. Predictive ability and accuracy is, of course, the main criterion by which positive (descriptive) economic models are evaluated. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3, 11-12 (1966);
THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS: AN ANTHOLOGY 180, 186 (Daniel M. Hausman ed.,
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both investor and manager behavior subject to an ambient mix of motives, incentives, aspirational legal mandates 14 and market forces 15), we
have been stuck at a crossroads for some time now. Descriptively, we
have been able to design coherent models of the firm that explain current
corporate reality (but for some “second- or third-order quibbling” 16 that
2d ed. 1984) (“But economic theory must be more than a structure of tautologies if it is
able to predict and not merely describe the consequences of action; if it is to be something different from disguised mathematics.”) (footnote omitted); Fred S. McChesney,
Positive Economics and All That, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 272, 278 (1992) (reviewing
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991)) (“Positive economics submits itself to the rigor of scientific
method. Submission means that the model’s value is to be judged not only by its internal consistency and adherence to accepted principles, but also by its ability to predict
the occurrence of events in the real world. It must be possible to derive from the model
behavioral implications, at least some of which must be empirically falsifiable and
therefore testable.”); Fred S. McChesney, The “Trans Union” Case: Smith v. Van Gorkom, in THE ICONIC CASES IN CORPORATE LAW 231, 253 (Jonathan R. Macey ed.,
2008); O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur, supra note 3, at 755, 757. See also BAINBRIDGE,
supra note 1, at 2-3; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Competing Concepts of the Corporation
(A.K.A. Criteria? Just Say No), 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 77, 81 (2005) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Competing Concepts]; Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Importance of Being Trusted,
81 B.U. L. Rev. 591, 596 (2001) [hereinafter Mitchell, Trusted].
14. Bainbridge, Abstention Doctrine, supra note 6, at 89 n.37; Julián Javier Garza,
Rethinking Corporate Governance: The Role of Minority Shareholders – A Comparative Study, 31 ST. MARY’S L.J. 613, 629 (2000); Ibrahim, supra note 6, at 934; Mitchell,
Trusted, supra note 13, at 613; Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1015 (1997); Rock & Wachter,
supra note 9, at 1608. See also Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Corporate Law
as a Facilitator of Self Governance, 34 GA. L. REV. 529, 529 (2000) [hereinafter Rock
& Wachter, Corporate Law as a Facilitator] (“[O]ne should think of fiduciary duty
cases as judicial sermons that exhort managers to consummate performance and that
criticize those who perform below expectations, even if, or perhaps especially when, no
direct legal sanction is imposed.”) (footnote omitted).
15. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Primacy, supra note 12, at 562; Margaret M. Blair &
Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in Corporate Law, 31 J.
CORP. L. 719, 724 (2006); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 252 (1999) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, A
Team Production]; Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board:
Promoting Accountability in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105, 119-20
(2006); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL.
ECON. 110, 112 (1965); Millon, supra note 3, at 230; Pinto, supra note 3, at 276-79.
16. Roberta Romano, What is the Value of Other Constituency Statutes to Shareholders?, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 533, 534 (1993); see also J. Mark Ramseyer, Economizing Legal D-B8, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 25, 29 n.12 (2005) (“Waffling is obligatory to
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remains). Normatively, however, our models operate in a large conceptual vacuum (or “black box”). We are regularly presupposing an unacknowledged “something” that is currently largely unexplained and unaccounted for—something that, for lack of a better general term, I call
“protolegal variables” 17—in order to control for both managerial behavior and the microtheoretical models of the firm that attempt to describe
and predict such behavior.
In a related article, 18 I have developed an absolute director primacy
model of the firm that has led me—at least, tentatively and for the time
being—to two conclusions and one dilemma. First, I concluded that the
board of directors of a Berle-Means corporation is the private-sector
equivalent of a modern Leviathan. 19 The board itself, not shareholders
on aggregate nor the corporation, is the corporate sovereign—both de
facto and de jure. Its decisionmaking is by fiat 20 and its decisionmaking
authority to run the corporation’s business and affairs as it sees fit is absolute, 21 original, 22 infinite 23 and, thus, sui generis24 (hence the moniker

law-review writing. I actually think it’s better. Probably.”)
17. By “protolegal variables,” I mean all those socio-contextual, behavior-oriented,
and reciprocal normative implications and foundations of interpersonal cooperation
which are based on “expectations,” “counter-expectations,” and “expectationexpectations.” See infra Parts IV-V.
18. Reich-Graefe, supra note 10.
19. Cf. Allen, supra note 9, at 1396 (“Under the liberal-utilitarian model, the law
creating and protecting property rights and the law enforcing contracts is the law of
greatest importance to our welfare. The legal value of the highest rank in this classical
liberal view is, I suppose, human liberty, and the greatest evil is oppression by the leviathan state.”) (footnote omitted).
20. Such authoritative decisional determination by the board is—in the genuine
meaning of the term “fiat”—both dictatorial and, ipse dixit, valid. It is non-reviewable
and, ipso facto, irrebuttably assumed to be right (which, of course, is exactly the effect
of the courts’ applications of the business judgment rule). See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (“The business judgment rule exists to protect and
promote full and free exercise of the managerial power grant to Delaware directors.”)
(citation omitted); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 38-45.
21. See HOWARD H. SPELLMAN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF LAW
GOVERNING CORPORATE DIRECTIONS 4-5 (1931) (“[M]odern decisions tend toward an
emphasis of the directors’ absolutism in the management of the affairs of large corporations; the board of directors has achieved a super-control of corporate management and
of the corporation’s legal relations . . . .”) (emphasis added); Morton J. Horwitz, Santa
Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 214
(1985) (“But modern corporate legislation, passed during the first quarter of the twentieth century, ratified a new ‘absolutism’ that courts themselves had already begun to
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“absolute director primacy”). 25 Comparable to the Hobbesian perpetual
bestow upon corporate directors.”) (emphasis added); see also Blair & Stout, A Team
Production, supra note 15, at 251 (stating that at the peak of the corporate hierarchy
“sits a board of directors whose authority over the use of corporate assets is virtually
absolute”).
22. Cf. Manson v. Curtis, 119 N.E. 559, 562 (N.Y. 1918); Burrill v. Nathant Bank,
2 Met. (Mass.) 163, 166-67 (1840); BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 3, at 74;
ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 22 (1986) (“The model behind corporate law’s
treatment of authority is one of a unilaterally controlled flow of authority from a single
wellspring of power rather than a bubbling up and flowing together of many individual
sources of personal power. The state has power; it chooses to delegate it to the board of
directors of a corporation.”); Horwitz, supra note 21, at 216.
23. Cf. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., in PROGRESSIVE
CORPORATE LAW 185, 190 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) [hereinafter Mitchell,
Trust] (“The power and control that are present in all fiduciary relationships is exaggerated in the corporation where the indeterminate length of the enterprise and the practically infinite array of investment opportunities for the corporation make any possibility
of specified limitations on directors’ power or ongoing control by the stockholders unrealistic.”).
24. Sui generis decisionmaking authority of corporate directors means that their
decisionmaking power is non-derivative. In particular, shareholder primacy models incorrectly assume that the decisionmaking authority of corporate boards is derivative,
i.e., delegated to corporate boards by the shareholder franchise—at least, through the
mechanism of board elections during which shareholders vote. This assumption ignores
the de lege lata reality of board authority. See supra note 29 and accompanying text;
see also Dooley, supra note 6, at 467 (describing the problem of allocating authority
within the corporate firm as “the universally recognized requirement for the establishment of, and vesting of supreme authority in, the board of directors”) (emphasis added);
Horwitz, supra note 21, at 214 (“At some point at the beginning of the twentieth century, American legal opinion began decisively to shift to the view that ‘the powers of
the board of directors … are identical with the powers of the corporation.’ Earlier, the
dominant view, as expressed by the United States Supreme Court, was that ‘when the
charter was silent, the ultimate determination of the management of the corporate affairs
rests with its stock holders.’”) (footnotes omitted).
25. Cf. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 6 (explaining
the director primacy model developed by Professor Bainbridge); BAINBRIDGE, supra
note 1; Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA
L. REV. 1 (2002); Bainbridge, Abstention Doctrine, supra note 6; Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601 (2006);
Bainbridge, Competing Concepts, supra note 13; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006); Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections, 55
STAN. L. REV. 791 (2002); Bainbridge, Primacy, supra note 12; Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Much Ado About Little? Directors’ Fiduciary Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 1 J.
BUS. & TECH. L. 335 (2007); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy
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bellum omnium contra omnes within the sovereign state, 26 I have argued
that the corporate entity is inescapably and insolubly characterized by
perpetual conflicts among self-interested corporate constituents. 27 To
manage those conflicts—which present a perennial, systemic risk to the
internal cohesion, adaptability and, thus, prosperity and ultimate survival
of the firm—corporate law is necessarily called upon to allocate infinite
and absolute decisionmaking authority within one core group of corporate constituents. 28 American corporate law is unmistakably clear as to
the identity of such single core group of corporate constituents—namely,
the corporation’s board of directors. 29 As a result, I have argued that the
well-advised, disinterested corporate board of a Berle-Means corporain Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769 (2006); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a
Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2002);
Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 196-98 (2004).
26. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN OR THE MATTER, FORM & POWER OF A
COMMONWEALTH, ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVIL, ch. 13 (1651) (“Hereby it is manifest,
that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are
in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every
man.”); cf. Peter J. Burke & Jan E. Stets, Trust and Commitment Through SelfVerification, 62 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 347, 347 (1999).
27. Reich-Graefe, supra note 10.
28. See KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 69 (1974) (“Under
conditions of widely dispersed information and the need for speed in decisions, authoritative control at the tactical level is essential for success.”); Allen, supra note 9, at
1400; Bainbridge, Primary, supra note 12, at 552; Dooley, supra note 6, at 466; see also Rock & Wachter, supra note 5, at 1621.
29. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2010). See also REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 8.01(b) (ABA 1984) (“All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation managed by or under the direction
of, its board of directors . . . .”). Under the corporation statutes of all states, corporations are managed by or under the direction of a board of directors as the statutory default rule. See, e.g., Dent, supra note 10, at 1216 (2008); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV.
89, 92 (2004); Ribstein, supra note 25, at 188. See also BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW,
supra note 3, at 72 (stating that (i) shareholders have “virtually no power to control” the
business and affairs of the corporation, (ii) the board of directors and senior management “effectively controls,” and (iii) “[a]s a doctrinal matter, moreover, corporate law
essentially carves this separation into stone”); COX & HAZEN, supra note 3, at 149 (stating that the board of directors “is legally the supreme authority in matters of the corporation’s regular business management”); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The European Origins
and the Spread of the Corporate Board of Directors, 33 STETSON L. REV. 925, 925
(2004) (“Around the world, the legal norm is that corporations are managed by, or under the direction of, a board of directors.”) (footnote omitted).
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tion is uncontrollable in absolute terms. 30 In other words, my absolute
director primacy model—unlike all other microtheoretical models of the
firm—explicitly denies that any meaningful measure of director accountability exists in American corporate law. 31
After having allocated absolute, original, infinite and sui generis
authority for making adaptive decisions for purposes of firm sustainability in a core group of decisionmakers, my second conclusion concerned
the end (rather than the means) of any corporate governance system. 32
Not only should such a system allocate authority and discretion for making adaptive decisions on behalf of the firm, 33 it should also define, if
possible, the norms and interests that should guide the internal decisionmakers in their decisionmaking. 34 Otherwise, any exercise of deci30.
31.

Reich-Graefe, supra note 10.
It should be noted that this statement is only made with regard to the agency
(cost) problem of directorial shirking, not the more controlled and controllable agency
(cost) problem of directorial stealing. In other words, directors are granted full discretion to act opportunistically—unfettered by any ex-ante or ex-post legal constraint—and
to favor any particular cause or firm participant interest over any and all others at any
point in time as long as (i) no controlling economic self-interest of directors is actualized (and remains unsanitized) in the decision, (ii) very minor and basic process due
care is complied with, and (iii) some rudimentary (and, possibly, entirely hypothetical)
rational basis and explanation can be construed as to why the prevailing consensus at
the time of the board action might have been that the corporation could ultimately benefit in some (tangible or intangible) shape or form. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE
LAW, supra note 3, at 110 (concluding that pursuant to the effects of the business judgment rule, corporate directors are given “carte blanche to make decisions that might
turn out badly, but no discretion to make selfish decisions”); Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 5, at 746 (stating that, as a matter of law, corporate directors remain
“insulated from the direct command and control of [shareholders] or any other corporate constituents”); Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate
Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1470 (2006); Stout, Proper Motives, supra
note 12, at 6 (stating that the business judgment rule “allows a director who makes even
a minimal effort to become “informed” to make foolhardy decisions all day long, without fear of liability”).
32. Cf. Bainbridge, Primacy, supra note 12, at 552.
33. Cf. Dooley, supra note 6, at 466; Susanna K. Ripken, Corporations Are People
Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 127-28 (2009) (discussing the treatment of the corporation’s internal decision structure (CID Structure) as developed by philosopher Peter
French; see PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (1984);
Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207 (1979)).
34. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 9, at 1400; Bainbridge, Primacy, supra note 12, at
552; Dooley, supra note 6, at 466. See also Rock & Wachter, supra note 5, at 1621.
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sionmaking authority would always be arbitrary: an uncontrollable board
of directors would also always be an out-of-control board of directors.
However, here I argue that there are no recognizable and enforceable decision-guiding norms or principles within our current American
corporate law as it is written. Accordingly, if, pursuant to my first conclusion above, I deny the existence of any ex-post-investment director
accountability in American corporate law, I logically end up now with
my second conclusion that denies the existence of any ex-anteinvestment determinability of director behavior. Corporate law does not
define the ends of corporate governance. It only builds an aspirational
and indeterminate profit-seeking motive into the corporate entity. 35
Whether and how directors will, in fact, seek overall profitability remains anyone’s guess. Furthermore, how directors can be motivated to
seek (optimal) profitability remains a mystery.
If these two conclusions were absolutely true, however, no rational
investor would be participating in a firm knowing that its central decisionmaker can always act arbitrarily and always get away with it. 36
Thus, I posit that the extent to which the board of directors as sovereign
may exercise its absolute, original, infinite and sui generis authority on
behalf of the corporation must be conditional on, and controlled by
“something”—“something” that, within current microtheoretical models
of the firm, is logically indeterminable. 37 Therefore, I argue that we
need to consider model-transcending protolegal variables (for example,
any applicable moral obligations) 38 and explain their external, exogenous influence 39 over current microtheoretical models of the firm 40 in or35. See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 738 (2005) (“Corporate managers have never had an enforceable
legal duty to maximize corporate profits.”); Rock & Wachter, supra note 5, at 1643-44.
36. Cf. Schlanger v. Four–Phase Systems Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538
(S.D.N.Y.1982) (stating with regard to investors who trade shares in well-developed
markets in reliance on the integrity of the price set by the market that ‘‘it is hard to imagine that there ever is a buyer or seller who does not rely on market integrity. Who
would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game?”). I argue that the same investors also rely on at least some minimum “floor” of integrity of corporate directors and
the resultant robustness of their decision-making—both in process and in substance.
37. Reich-Graefe, supra note 10.
38. In the parlance of economics, there is, however, the risk that these variables
turn out to be “observable, but not verifiable.” See Oliver Hart, Norms and Theory of
the Firm, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1701, 1702 (2001) [hereinafter Hart, Norms and Theory];
Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1617.
39. Cf. Hart, Norms and Theory, supra note 38, at 1702.
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der to properly model the firm-internal intricacies of corporate governance with sufficient predictive ability.
Finally, all of the above presents the absolute director primacy
model with an immediate dilemma: 41 the board of directors in a BerleMeans corporation is not only autocratic, but it can also be totalitarian if,
when and where it so pleases. 42 As a matter of corporate law, the board
of directors is akin to an “unguided missile.” There are no recognizable
decision-guiding norms or principles—either enforceable 43 or aspirational 44—within our current American corporate law as it is written. It
seems that the inner intelligibility of our corporate law aspires to be intentionally and purposefully unspecified and diffuse. 45 Inevitably,
40. Cf. Allen, supra note 9, at 1397 (describing how proponents of the social model
of human interaction see the utility of law resting “in part on presupposition of shared
norms including those of fairness and trust”).
41. Cf. Blair & Stout, Trustworthiness, supra note 5, at 1807 (calling this dilemma
a “riddle” of corporate law); Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 8 (describing this
dilemma as a “basic mystery”).
42. Cf. Blair & Stout, Trustworthiness, supra note 5, at 1791 (“The net result is
that, as a practical matter, a negligent director is more likely to be hit by lightning after
leaving her board meeting than she is to pay damages.”); Jones, supra note 15, at 117
(“Independent directors face an infinitesimal risk of paying personally for damages to
the corporation caused by their breach of fiduciary duty.”); Mitchell, Trust, supra note
23, at 190 (stating that “directors have largely unlimited power over the corporation and
its affairs”); Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 6 (“The business judgment rule . .
. allows a director who makes even a minimal effort to become ‘informed’ to make
foolhardy decisions all day long, without fear of liability.”); id. at 7 (“[I]t is only a slight
exaggeration to suggest that a corporate director is statistically more likely to be attacked by killer bees than she is to have to ever pay damages for breach of the duty of
care.”). See also Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP.
L. 239, 242 (2009) (“It is dangerous and costly to assume that fiduciary duties function
well in the corporate context. The assumption may give shareholders a false sense of
security or a belief that they are able to discipline management effectively when in fact,
because of the very limited nature of corporate governance duties, they are not.”).
43. Cf. Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 614.
44. Bainbridge, Abstention Doctrine, supra note 6, at 89 n.37; Garza, supra note
14, at 629; Ibrahim, supra note 6, at 934; Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 613-14;
Rock, supra note 14, at 1015; Rock & Wachter, supra note 9. See also Rock & Wachter, Corporate Law as a Facilitator, supra note 14. (“[O]ne should think of fiduciary
duty cases as judicial sermons that exhort managers to consummate performance and
that criticize those who perform below expectations, even if, or perhaps especially
when, no direct legal sanction is imposed.”) (footnote omitted).
45. Cf. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 403, 436 (2001) (“As a solu-
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boards can be opportunistic and generate substantial, entirely uncontrollable economic agency costs for the investment positions of other firm
participants within the corporate wealth-generation structure. 46 Correspondingly, as an investor, one seems to be relegated to only something
like “hope” 47 (or—more to the point—“trust,” “loyalty” and similar socio-contextual, 48 behavior-oriented and reciprocal 49 variables 50 based on
pre-coded expectations and counter-expectations and aimed at reducing
social complexity 51) that directors know what they do, that they have intion to the contracting problems associated with team production, the mediating board is
obviously messy.”).
46. See Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 4 (stating that, if we only consider
financial rewards to directors, i.e., make assumptions based only on rational selfish behavior of directors, “directors seem to have little reason to break a sweat in the boardroom”).
47. Cf. id. at 18 (stating that “we must inevitably rely on directors’ internalized
sense of responsibility as their primary if not their sole motive for exercising judgment
and care”) (emphasis added).
48. See id. at 13.
49. Cf. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of
Reciprocity, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 159, 159 (2000) (“Reciprocity means that in response to
friendly actions, people are frequently much nicer and much more cooperative than predicted by the self-interest model; conversely, in response to hostile actions they are frequently much more nasty and even brutal.”).
50. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 9, at 1402 (trust, loyalty); Bainbridge, Primacy, supra note 12, at 551 n.21 (guardianship, duty); Dent, supra note 10, at 1221 (trust); Hart,
An Economist’s View, supra note 3, at 306 (reputation, integrity); Hart, Norms and
Theory, supra note 38, at 1702 (honesty, trust); id. at 1703 (decency, fairness); id. at
1714 (reputation, trustworthiness); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust and Team Production
in Post-Capitalist Society, 24 J. CORP. L. 869 (1999) [hereinafter Mitchell, Trust and
Team] (trust, loyalty, duty); O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur, supra note 3, at 767 (integrity); id. at 769 (confidence); Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1608 (corporate culture);
id. at 1609 (trust); id. at 1611 (credibility); id. at 1613 (reputation); D. Gordon Smith,
Team Production and Venture Capital Investing, 24 J. CORP. L. 949, 969 (1999) (firm
reputation); Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 1 (altruism); id. at 7 (reputation);
id. at 8-9 (sense of honor, responsibility, sense of obligation; integrity, trustworthiness);
id. at 20 (character).
51. Cf. NIKLAS LUHMANN, LOVE AS PASSION: THE CODIFICATION OF INTIMACY (Jeremy Gaines & Doris L. Jones trans., 1986); NIKLAS LUHMANN, RISK: A SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY (Nico Stehr & Gotthard Bechmann trans., 1993); NIKLAS LUHMANN, SOCIAL
SYSTEMS (John Bednarz, Jr. & Dirk Baecker, trans., 1995); NIKLAS LUHMANN, TRUST
AND POWER 69 (Howard Davis et al. trans., 1979); Niklas Luhmann, Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING
COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 94, 97 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988) [hereinafter Luhmann,
Familiarity] (“You cannot live without forming expectations with respect to contingent
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ternalized the correct moral compass, 52 and, thus, using such compass,
will “do the right thing” 53 more often than not. 54 However, hope—as a
form of nonrational, intuitive confidence in particular outcomes that is
designed to avoid the rational analysis of, and confrontation with, the
consequences of current actions—does not appear to be something that
we can and should accept as a satisfactory explanation and basis for the
daily phenomenon of general investor confidence ex-ante-investment in
the face of absent director accountability ex-post-investment. 55 The inquiry thus becomes: if profit-maximizing is not enforced by corporate
law, 56 why does it nonetheless happen as a matter of almost overwhelming routine in today’s corporate reality? 57 If indeed, director primacy is
events and you have to neglect, more or less, the possibility of disappointment. You
neglect this because it is a very rare possibility, but also because you do not know what
else to do. The alternative is to live in a state of permanent uncertainty and to withdraw
expectations without having anything with which to replace them.”). See also Blair &
Stout, Trustworthiness, supra note 5, at 1796; Geoffrey P. Miller, Norms and Interests,
32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 637, 641 (2003); Mitchell, Trust, supra note 23, at 191; Lynn A.
Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 407, 410-15 (2002) [hereinafter Stout, Investor Confidence].
52. Cf. Elhauge, supra note 35, at 740 (“internalized moral norms”); Stout, Proper
Motives, supra note 12, at 23 (“internal gyroscope”).
53. Cf. Nadelle Grossman, Director Compliance with Elusive Fiduciary Duties in a
Climate of Corporate Governance Reform, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 393, 465-66
(2007); Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1608; Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12,
at 9, 23. See also Michael J. Meurer, Law, Economics, and the Theory of the Firm, 52
BUFF. L. REV. 727, 740 (2004) (stating with regard to the problem of unforeseeable contingencies in transaction-cost-theory ‘contracting’ that “this begs the questions of how a
firm gets managers to be pure profit maximizers”).
54. To complicate things further, much of what happens in the corporate boardroom (and can be hoped to happen in the boardroom) depends on the particular corporation and follows the (aspirational and prevailing) procedures, standards and practices
for director behavior of such specific corporation; see, e.g., Rock & Wachter, supra
note 9, at 1608.
55. Cf. Mitchell, Trust, supra note 23, at 191 (“Why would anybody invest money
in a corporation, an institution over which she has no control?”); Stout, Proper Motives,
supra note 12, at 3; id. at 8 (asking why directors “seem to mostly live up to our trust”);
id. at 9 (“Rational investors would never cede control of tens of trillions of dollars of
assets to purely self-interested boards, given the tissue-paper thin protection offered by
the rules of fiduciary duty, and the limits of social sanctions.”).
56. Cf. Rock & Wachter, supra note 5, at 1643-44.
57. Or formulated differently, the question is not only “[w]hy do shareholders in
public companies have so little power?” (Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of
Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 792 (2007) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
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absolute and our theoretical models are all reliant on protolegal variables
to explain general investor confidence ex-ante-investment despite the
lack of director accountability ex-post-investment, then how can director
primacy be understood and explained as a principled and, thus, just corporate governance structure in the first place? Or is director primacy not
only absolute, but also without principle?
This Article provides a roadmap for purposes of answering this inquiry. Part II further describes the problem left unsolved to date—
namely, that we currently use largely unexplained and, thus, unaccounted-for protolegal variables to explain and predict the decisionmaking behavior of corporate directors. Part III essays to explain why—
conceptually and normatively—we appear to need, and thus develop,
distributional, ergo macrotheoretical, models of the firm in the first
place. Those models place the decisionmaking behavior of corporate directors in the larger context of our social polity. 58 They inevitably address the social benefits and costs of doing business in the corporate
form 59 and the resultant questions of sociopolitical legitimacy and allocative and distributive justice of the corporate endeavor. 60 Parts IV and V
Stout, Mythical Benefits]), but why do shareholders in public companies have so little
power and still invest? Why do investors who know that they have almost no power
over their investment ex post (other than investment exit with a predictable loss of value) still confidently decide to invest without any ex ante bargained-for accountability in
place? Cf. id. at 801 (pointing out an often overlooked fact of business life, namely that
“investors are not forced to purchase shares in public corporations at gunpoint.”); id. at
803 (“Is it possible that shareholders, like Ulysses, sometimes see advantage in ‘tying
their own hands’ and ceding control over the corporation to directors largely insulated
from their own influence?”).
58. Cf. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate Law?, in THE
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1, 18
(2004); Mitchell, Trust and Team, supra note 50, at 870; Romano, supra note 1, at 924;
Wallman, Understanding, supra note 10, at 809-10. Contra Ronald J. Gilson, Separation and the Function of Corporation Law, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 141, 147 (2005)
(“The point is that markets encourage a management and governance structure that fits
the corporation’s business. Corporate law has nothing to add to the process.”).
59. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 819, 824; Lee, supra note 10, at 538-39;
Benedict Sheehy, Corporations and Social Costs: The Wal-Mart Case Study, 24 J.L. &
COM. 1, 3, 17-20 (2004); Randall S. Thomas, What is Corporate Law’s Place in Promoting Societal Welfare?: An Essay in Honor of Professor William Klein, 2 BERKELEY
BUS. L.J. 135, 135 (2005).
60. Cf. Allen, supra note 9, at 1396-97; Millon, supra note 3, at 201-02; Edward
Rock & Michael Wachter, Meeting By Signals, Playing By Norms: Complementary Accounts of Nonlegal Cooperation in Institutions, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 423, 434 (2002);
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survey and evaluate the more recent interest of the legal academia in the
co-existence of (corporate) law and norms and the latter’s impact on
(and, maybe, complete control over) the former—the so-called “law and
norms” literature. 61

II. THE PROBLEM LEFT UNSOLVED: PROTOLEGAL VARIABLES
The research on corporate governance can be described as the gradual unfolding of the formerly hidden inner workings of a “black box”
(in the sense of observable inputs, “hidden inner magic,” observable
outputs, and end of story). 62 Originally, very little academic attention
was given to how corporations work on the inside, as corporate law itself was deemed uninspiring and lacking any true intellectual vigor. 63
Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1608.
61. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Melvin A. Eisenberg, Fairness, Character, and
Efficiency in Firms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1717, 1717 (2001); Jones, supra note 15, at
121-24; Kahan, supra note 5, at 1870; Rock & Wachter, supra note 5, at 1621-22.
62. See e.g., Allen, supra note 9, at 1398 (stating that, until recently, “the internal
operation of corporate actors was no more interesting than the internal operation of human actors”); Meurer, supra note 53, at 729-30 (describing the original theories of
Coase and Williamson as treating the firm “like a black box in which authority avoids
transaction costs” and concluding that “[m]odern research on the firm opens up the
black box and gives a better account of how firms are organized and the costs and benefits of firm governance”); O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur, supra note 3, at 757 (stating the
firm is a “black box” in classical and neoclassical perfect competition theory); Walter
W. Powell, Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization, 12 RES.
ORGAN. BEHAV. 295, 296 (1990) (describing the paradigm shift developed by Ronald
Coase in 1937, conceiving of the firm as a governing structure, thus, “breaking with orthodox accounts of the firm as a ‘black box’ production function”); Christopher D.
Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE
L.J. 1, 8 (1980) (claiming regulatory enforcement intervention imposes direct and selective constraints on how investors and managers work out various internal firm relationships and the “black box” prerogative of the enterprise’s interior is, thus, overcome).
63. See, e.g., Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay
for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 245 n.37 (1962) (famously conveying his sentiment
of listlessness by stating that corporate law, “as a field of intellectual effort, is dead in
the United States” and that nothing was left “but our great empty corporation statutes—
towering skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together and containing nothing but wind”); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in Corporate Theory, 56
CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2006) (stating that corporate law scholarship was “[v]irtually
nontheoretical until the mid 1970s”); O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur, supra note 3, at 763
(stating that after the Berle-Means era, “corporation law scholarship, if not ‘dead,’ was
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Once Berle and Means, however, had formulated their separation paradigm, corporate law became gradually stuck with answering the two deceptively simple, but fundamentally elusive questions of the former
“black box” of corporate governance—namely: “who control(s)?” and
“whose interest(s) control(s)?” 64
My answers to these two core questions of corporate governance, as
developed in my absolute director primacy model, 65 are as follows:
monitoring 66 and bonding 67 of corporate directors by other firm participants, at its very best, incompletely protects the participants’ respective
firm-specific investments. 68 Not only do directors have a residual set of
options available to exercise their decisionmaking authority in an opportunistic manner, 69 but, as a matter of corporate law, they have a complete set of nonreviewable options available pursuant to their absolute,
sui generis decisionmaking authority. The core agency (cost) problem
of corporate governance 70 is not simply residual, it is center-stage, abso-

certainly viewed as an intellectual backwater”); Romano, supra note 1, at 923 (confirming that “[u]ntil recently, corporate law has been an uninspiring field for research even
to some of its most astute students”).
64. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 10, 21; CLARK, supra note 22, at 690; Bainbridge, Primacy, supra note 12, at 549-50; Dooley, supra note 6, at 466; Reich-Graefe,
supra note 10.
65. Reich-Graefe, supra note 10.
66. Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 5, at 743; James D. Cox & Harry
L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 83-84 (1985); Michael B.
Dorff, Does One Hand Wash the Other? Testing the Managerial Power and Optimal
Contracting Theories of Executive Compensation, 30 J. CORP. L. 255, 257 (2005); Elhauge, supra note 35, at 739 (“[A] legal duty to maximize profits is too hard to monitor.”); Pinto, supra note 3, at 260.
67. Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 4 (“Closer analysis suggests . . . that . .
. bonding is mostly illusory.”).
68. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, Trustworthiness, supra note 5, at 1807-08; Cooter &
Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 1719-20; Ribstein, supra note 31, at 1434; Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1614.
69. Cf. Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1614; Richter, supra note 5, at 174-75
(“Under Knightian uncertainty, it is impossible to write a complete contract that details
all possible future contingencies, even if transaction costs are zero. Therefore, contracts
unavoidably contain loopholes and the lock-in of the parties may invite opportunistic
behavior by the other side because the parties may be unable to verify their case to a
third party (e.g. a court) due to information costs (a special kind of transaction costs).”)
(footnote omitted).
70. See, e.g. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 3, at 75 (“Much of corpo-
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lute and systemic under the absolute director primacy model. Corporate
directors are given vast latitude and incentive to misbehave by shirking
on their performance. 71 As a result, when the opportunity to exercise
nonreviewable options arises, director behavior is absolutely unpredictable. We no longer operate on a straightforward dyadic motivational
plane: we can no longer assume that directors act either in their own selfish economic interest 72 or in the economic interest of a clearly defined
group of firm participants (for example, shareholders). 73 Directors can
exercise their control over the corporate venture in any manner. Thus,
there is complete, not residual, resource scarcity for investors. 74 Once
we admit that we are operating in a world where legal constraints on the
decisional substance of genuinely disinterested director behavior are entirely lacking (other than, perhaps, at the outermost limits of where rationality ventures into irrationality), it becomes clear that investors face
complete scarcity of information 75—both ex-ante and ex-post—over
which decisional motives and incentives will control (or have controlled) directorial decisionmaking in a particular context. 76
rate law is best understood as a mechanism for containing . . . agency costs.”); Blair &
Stout, Team Production, supra note 5, at 743 (describing the agency cost problem of
monitoring managers and motivating them to act as faithful agents as “the central economic problem to be faced in a public corporation” for those following the principalagent model of the firm); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Basic Governance Structure, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 33 (2004); Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 4, at 740-48 (discussing the agency problem as the central problem of corporate governance).
71. Johnson, supra note 63, at 4-5; Reich-Graefe, supra note 10.
72. Stout, Investor Confidence, supra note 51, at 412.
73. Cf. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 3, at 76; RICHARD W.
HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, CORPORATIONS 505, 506 (5th ed. 2006); Blair &
Stout, A Team Production, supra note 15, at 290; Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note
57, at 804.
74. Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1614.
75. Id.
76. This is the only substance of the so-called “waste doctrine” or “outer-limits
test” employed by courts in order to probe for alleged due care violations with regard to
the substance (rather than the process) of directorial behavior. See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) (en banc) (stating that the outer limits of directorial
behavior “are confined to unconscionable cases where directors irrationally squander or
give away corporate assets”); Glazer v. Zapata Corp., 658 A.2d 176, 183 (Del. Ch.
1993) (describing the legal test for corporate waste as “severe” and explaining the test
as follows: “Directors are guilty of corporate waste, only when they authorize an exchange that is so one sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could
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The relationship between directors and other firm participants is,
therefore, characterized by intentionally incomplete contracting. 77 Unlike all other models of the firm developed to date, the absolute director
primacy model is the only model that posits that the incompleteness
overwhelmingly predominates (and intentionally so); that the gaps, the
missing parts, significantly outweigh and outnumber those parts of the
corporate nexus that we can currently explain and account for in our
models. Accordingly, the role and purpose of our current law of corporate governance cannot focus on legal enforcement of what is not there
(or is only aspired to be there in directorial behavior sua sponte). 78
Simply too much substance (which results in observable directorial behavioral compliance and board integrity) is not there unless by way of a
complex process of autopoiesis. 79 We can observe and explain why it is
conclude that the corporation has received adequate consideration. If reasonable, informed minds might disagree on the question, then in order to preserve the wide domain
over which knowledgeable business judgment may safely act, a reviewing court will not
attempt to itself evaluate the wisdom of the bargain or the adequacy of the consideration.”); Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) (explaining that directors might be held liable under the waste test in cases where the benefit to the corporation is “so disproportionately small as to lie beyond the range at which any reasonable
person might be willing to trade.”). Cf. Dooley, supra note 6, at 479-80 (describing
possible board decisions that “even viewed ex ante, seem so degraded from ordinary
prudential standards as to seem at least ‘half-crazy,’ if not full-blown demented”); David Rosenberg, Galactic Stupidity and the Business Judgment Rule, 32 J. CORP. L. 301,
304 (2007); id. at 314 (“There must be a point at which a court will look at a decision
that appears to be free from any hint of disloyalty and review it simply because of its
utter galactic stupidity.”) (footnote omitted).
77. Cf. Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1614. Contractarian theories of the firm
use the words ‘contract’ and ‘contractual’ in a broader sense to include non-consensual
rational economic relationships that are premised on implicit, self-governing arrangements between firm participants which do not result from express bargaining and, thus,
do not constitute actual contracts in the legal sense. See, e.g., HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 73, at 330; Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 822-23; Rock & Wachter, supra note
5, at 1650, 1688; Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1613. Accordingly, within this Article, I indicate such broader contractarian use of the words ‘contract’ and ‘contractual’
by enclosing them in single quotation marks.
78. The current legal literature on incomplete contracting demonstrates that the law
only responds to contractual incompleteness by invoking reliance, forbearance and a
narrow interpretation of the existing (though incomplete) substance of the contract. In
other words, contractual gap-filling by courts proceeds in a very measured and reluctant
fashion. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of
Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 271-72 (1992).
79. Cf. Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 614 (“Ideally, and in its original design,
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not there when it is not there. However, we cannot explain how it got
there when it is there. We want (and, logically, need) discretion of corporate directors. 80 Moreover, as I argue under the absolute director
primacy model, directorial discretion is absolute and nonreviewable. 81
Thus, one may argue that the current state of our corporate governance
system is characterized not only by intentional incompleteness, but also
by an intentional and purposeful refusal to provide any legal mechanism
of accountability to fill those canyon-wide ‘contractual’ gaps created by
absolute, nonreviewable directorial discretion. Such refusal, at the same
time, also constitutes a decided rejection by corporate law to provide
model-immanent meaning to macrotheoretical, allocative and distributive concerns entering the realm of corporate governance. Thus, it evidences a decided rejection to provide any inner legitimacy or intelligibility within the domain of either the letter or the spirit of corporate law.
So far then, my answers to the two fundamental questions of corporate law are as follows: First, we know who controls—namely, directors,
with absolute primacy. However, second, when we ask whose interest(s) control(s), we are faced with both a complete ex-ante indeterminability of director behavior and, thus, a complete ex-ante unpredictability of director behavior within the absolute director primacy model.
Those answers may simply suggest the weakness of my model. However, I believe that they accurately reflect (at least, with regard to directorial decisionmaking power and its consequences on controlling interests,
if any) both corporate and corporate law reality.
As a consequence of these (provisionally incomplete) answers to
the two fundamental questions of corporate governance, I need to look
somewhere outside the realm of corporate law for something that corporate law not only presupposes but that is of critical use to corporate law
(as well as the theoretical models of the firm) in order to allow for the
fiduciary obligation is self-enforcing.”).
80. See, e.g., ARROW, supra note 28, at 78 (“If every decision of A is to be reviewed by B, then all we have really is a shift in the locus of authority from A to B and
hence no solution to the original problem.”); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 11; Bainbridge, Primacy, supra note 12, at 573 (“Neither discretion nor accountability can be
ignored because both promote values essential to the survival of business organizations.
Unfortunately, they are ultimately antithetical: one cannot have more of one without
also having less of the other. At some point, directors cannot be made more accountable without undermining their discretionary authority.”) (footnote omitted); Dooley, supra note 6, at 470.
81. Reich-Graefe, supra note 10.
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simple fact that firm investments can be made confidently ex-ante. 82
From all we can tell, these investments are made—daily and literally
millions of times over, 83 and with a good measure of predictive accuracy. Therefore, something currently left unexplained must allow for investor confidence and economic efficiency ex-ante-investment. 84 Something exists that makes absolute director primacy principled, so that firm
participants willingly make firm-specific investments despite the lack of
director accountability ex-post-investment.
This “something” I call “protolegal variables.” With this admittedly open-ended and diffuse 85 label, I try to distill into one category all
those socio-contextual, 86 behavior-oriented and reciprocal 87 normative
implications and foundations of interpersonal cooperation 88 which are
based on expectations and counter-expectations. 89 I will explain them in
82. Cf. Dorff, supra note 66, at 257 (“To induce investors to buy stock ex ante,
corporate governance law must be designed to give confidence that managers will seldom cheat and that when they do cheat they will generally be detected and punished.”).
83. For example, the average daily trading volume on the New York Stock Exchange for NYSE-listed companies in 2009 totaled 7,982,926 trading transactions per
diem, comprising an average of 2,179,775,581 shares traded for a total average consideration of $46,670,638,331.
Facts & Figures: Interactive Viewer, NYSE,
http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer_edition.asp?mode=table&key=
3002&category=3. See also Blair & Stout, Trustworthiness, supra note 5, at 1737.
84. Cf. Bainbridge, Competing Concepts, supra note 13, at 80; William A. Klein,
Criteria for Good Laws of Business Associations, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 13, 15 (2005).
85. See Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust and Economic Organization,
36 J.L. & ECON. 453, 469 (1993) [hereinafter Williamson, Calculativeness] (“If calculative relations are best described in calculative terms, then diffuse terms, of which trust
is one, that have mixed meanings should be avoided when possible.”). Cf. Diego Gambetta, Can We Trust Trust?, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE
RELATIONS 213, 213-14 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988) (“irritating rhetorical flabbiness”).
See also Richard A. Epstein, Contract and Trust in Corporate Law: The Case of Corporate Opportunity, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5, 10 (1996) (“At some point concrete rules will
have to give way, or at least share the stage, with other rules of a more general and diffuse nature.”).
86. See Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 13.
87. Cf. Fehr & Gächter, supra note 49, at 159.
88. It is interesting to note in this context that economists describe the various
forms of opportunism and other agency costs related to the firm as “moral hazards.”
See, e.g., Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 5, at 748; Meurer, supra note 53,
at 733-34.
89. LUHMANN, LOVE, supra note 51; LUHMANN, RISK, supra note 51; LUHMANN,
SOCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 51; LUHMANN, TRUST, supra note 51; Luhmann, Familiarity, supra note 51, at 97 (“You cannot live without forming expectations with respect to

486

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVI

Part IV and V of this Article in more detail. However, before I do, I
must explain how and where in the corporate governance process they
come into play. Figure 1 illustrates this process schematically.
Figure 1
The Decisionmaking Black Box

Almost eighty years after Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’ seminal
study, 90 I posit that we are still looking at the same basic “black box” I
mentioned above 91 with its still hidden inner magic. As corporate theorists, we certainly have made progress by determining the designated
function of the black box within corporate governance—namely, to generate certain control outputs from a wide range of factual inputs that
provide (at least, incomplete empirical) answers as to “who control(s)?”
and “whose interest(s) control(s)?” It is the core functionality of the
contingent events and you have to neglect, more or less, the possibility of disappointment. You neglect this because it is a very rare possibility, but also because you do not
know what else to do. The alternative is to live in a state of permanent uncertainty and
to withdraw expectations without having anything with which to replace them.”). See
also Blair & Stout, Trustworthiness, supra note 5, at 1796; Miller, supra note 51, at
641; Mitchell, Trust, supra note 23, at 191; Stout, Investor Confidence, supra note 51,
at 410-15.
90. BERLE, JR. & MEANS, supra note 2.
91. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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black box to generate those output determinations in every new context
of a given corporate reality necessitating an exercise of corporate control. However, we have not yet deciphered and explained the precise inner workings of the corporate decisionmaking black box so that we
could arrive at any genuine measure of predictive accuracy for those
particularized output determinations. I posit that we still have no welldeveloped idea—at least, not within the framework of corporate law—as
to how corporate directors will select from a complete, virtually unlimited range of options92 and, in particular, how they are incentivized to
repeatedly select “properly” and to “do the right thing.” 93 In other
words, inputs and outputs are observable. The rest, in the middle—
which, of course, is the main interest—is not observable. The magic is
still hidden. However, my best guess is that we can begin to explain and
uncover the magic by focusing on model-critical protolegal variables.
They may be the hidden catalysts that create intuitive ex-ante determinability for firm participants and that make director behavior sufficiently
predictable for firm participants to invest and, thus, for the wealth creation exercise that is the corporate form at work to exist. 94
To begin to understand why the middle is so difficult to explain,
why we still have no well-developed idea as to how corporate directors
act the way they act (which is usually in a non-opportunistic manner)
and why they act in such a manner even without any legal constraints as
part of the motivational picture, one inevitably ends up focusing on macrotheoretical models of the firm. These, by definition, struggle with the
firm not only as a non-market, hierarchical structure of wealth creation,
but predominantly with its overall place in society and with the eternal
macro-question of corporate law—namely, whether and to what extent
the corporate entity as an institution of private property and private-party
ordering in the means of economic production and wealth maximization
should be subordinated to the legitimate claims of the larger society that
inextricably embeds its wealth maximization exercise. This, in turn,
92.
93.

Cf. Mitchell, Trust, supra note 23.
Cf. Grossman, supra note 53, at 465-66; Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at
1608; Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 9. See also Meurer, supra note 53, at
740 (stating with regard to the problem of unforeseeable contingencies in transactioncost-theory ‘contracting’ that “this begs the questions of how a firm gets managers to be
pure profit maximizers”).
94. Note again that protolegal variables may turn out to be “observable, but not
verifiable.” Cf. Hart, Norms and Theory, supra note 38, at 1702; Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1617. Thus, the magic may, indeed, remain invisible to our eyes.
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more thoroughly explains why we develop macrotheoretical models of
the firm in the first place and why this macrotheorectical realm is not
only of theoretical, but of practical relevance for directorial behavior
characterized by absolute, unfettered decisionmaking power and discretion.

III. WHY MACROTHEORETICAL MODELS OF THE FIRM?
Macrotheoretical models of the firm 95 are less concerned with the
inner workings of the firm (i.e., its internal cohesion, adaptability and
survival as a generator and maximizer of productive output and economic wealth). 96 Instead, they focus on the firm’s characteristics and impacts as (i) a social institution (i.e., a public good), 97 and (ii) a generator
of externalities, both positive (i.e., social benefits) and negative (i.e., social costs). 98 These models exist because no corporation is truly an island of economic activity, 99 rather, it is inextricably embedded in the
larger context of our societal polity. 100 Business corporations not only
create and maximize wealth (when they are successful), they also distribute wealth 101—by necessity and simultaneously. Every instance of
95.
96.

As opposed to “microtheoretical” models of the firm; see supra note 9.
Cf. Allen, supra note 9, at 1396; Millon, supra note 3, at 201-02; Rock &
Wachter, supra note 9, at 1608.
97. Cf. BERLE, JR. & MEANS, supra note 2, at 352-53; Mitchell, Trust and Team,
supra note 50, at 870; Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 5, at 748.
98. Cf. Sheehy, supra note 59, at 17; Thomas, supra note 59, at 135.
99. Cf. DENNIS H. ROBERTSON, THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRY 84 (1923) (stating that
firms are “islands of conscious power in this ocean of unconscious co-operation [namely, the market] like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk”); George B.
Richardson, The Organisation of Industry, 82 Econ. J. 883, 883 (1972) (describing
firms in general as “islands of planned co-ordination in a sea of market relations”). See
also Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 393 (1937) (“These,
then, are the reasons why organisations such as firms exist in a specialised exchange
economy in which it is generally assumed that the distribution of resources is ‘organised’ by the price mechanism. A firm, therefore, consists of the system of relationships which comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent on an
entrepreneur.”); Powell, supra note 62, at 297; Rock & Wachter, supra note 5, at 1621.
100. Cf. Allen, supra note 12, 261, 264-65; Romano, supra note 1, at 924. See also
John Donne, Meditation XVII, in DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS 107, 108
(1624) (“No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a
part of the main.”).
101. If business corporations are not successful, they, of course, destroy wealth and
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wealth creation is, ipso facto, an instance of wealth distribution. 102 Corporate governance is the mere structure and mechanism of how those
simultaneous instances of wealth creation and wealth distribution come
about. In my view, all corporate decisionmaking by a board of directors
logically reduces to (i) allocating existing wealth (productive resources)
to the corporate endeavor, (ii) setting in motion the processes to create
future wealth, and (iii) distributing such existing and future wealth
among the whole range of firm participants (for example, as salaries to
employees, dividends to stockholders, fees to suppliers, rebates to customers, taxes to local, state and federal authorities, etc.). 103 Corporate
law is, thus, part of our system of justice and the rule of law. It is part of
our system of private-sector ordering. Inevitably then, the (apparently,
for some, “ugly” 104) problem of socioeconomic and sociopolitical effidistribute losses.
102. It is an often underestimated fact that every single board decision does both—
allocating resources and distributing (future) benefits—simultaneously and often with
allocative and distributive effects to multiple if not (at least, indirectly) all firm participants. What I mean here is that it is (too) often overlooked that, in the reality of the
going-concern operation of the firm, there is no bifurcation whatsoever between the
time the board acts hiring productive resources in order to create value and the time the
board acts in order to distribute to the firm’s value participants the cash flows resulting
from the creation of value. Every time the board (or upper management) acts, including
when it hires productive resources, it instantly allocates and distributes currently available as well as future cash flows among all firm participants. Thus, on a daily basis, future cash flows are pre-booked, pre-committed and pre-spent—when money comes in,
some of it (or all of it, or even more than it) has already gone out. Accordingly, there is
no factual distinction possible between wealth creation and wealth distribution, as both
occur simultaneously once the corporation becomes a going concern.
103. Cf. Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1214-15 (Del. 1996) (“Likewise, business decisions are not an abdication of directorial authority merely because they limit a
board’s freedom of future action. A board which has decided to manufacture bricks has
less freedom to decide to make bottles. In a world of scarcity, a decision to do one thing
will commit a board to a certain course of action and make it costly and difficult (indeed, sometimes impossible) to change course and do another. This is an inevitable fact
of life and is not an abdication of directorial duty.”).
104. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise on Corporate Law:
Filling Manning’s Empty Towers, 31 J. CORP. L. 599, 604 n.21 (2006). See also Milton
Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is To Increase Profits, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE, Sept. 13, 1970 (arguing that “the doctrine of ‘social responsibility’ involves
the acceptance of the socialist view that political mechanisms, not market mechanisms,
are the appropriate way to determine the allocation of scarce resources to alternative
uses”); Gilson, supra note 58, at 147 n.12 (pointing out that “markets encourage a management and governance structure that fits the corporation’s business” and that
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ciency, legitimacy and ultimate justice raises its head. 105
A. JURISPRUDENTIAL MACRODICHOTOMIES
Unlike microtheoretical models of the firm, with their focus on the
interdependent dichotomies between (i) discretion and accountability of
corporate decisionmaking 106 and (ii) market value and societal value as
controlling backstops for such decisionmaking, 107 macrotheoretical
models of the firm are defined by the following three fundamental macrodichotomies:
• Aristotelean notions of rectification (corrective justice) and

“[c]orporate law has nothing to add to the process”). See also Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainability, Distribution, and the Macroeconomic Analysis of Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1,
22 (2001) (“More than one commentator has speculated that the disappearance of limits
in macroeconomics serves as a theoretical expedient to avoid difficult questions of distribution.”); Lee, supra note 10, at 575 (“The terms ‘morality’ and ‘justice’ may raise
red flags for readers skeptical of deontology and inclined toward consequentialism.”).
105. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 58, at 18 (“As a normative matter, the overall objective of corporate law—as any branch of law—is presumably to
serve the interest of society as a whole. More particularly, the appropriate goal of corporate law is to advance the aggregate welfare of a firm’s shareholders, employees,
suppliers, and customers without undue sacrifice—and, if possible, with benefit—to
third parties such as local communities and beneficiaries or the natural environment.
That is what economists would characterize as the pursuit of overall social efficiency.”);
Mitchell, Trust and Team, supra note 50, at 870 (describing the understanding of corporate organization in terms of team production not only as a “tale […] of economics
alone” but also as “to conceive of the corporation as a political institution” and “as a
social institution”); Pinto, supra note 3, at 257 n.2 (“Because of the importance of publicly traded corporation in society, there are significant issues over the focus of corporate governance, how power should be allocated within the corporation and the role of
law and non-legal mechanisms in protecting investors and other stakeholders and allowing those who manage to effectively function.”); Wallman, Understanding, supra note
10, at 809-10 (concluding that corporate governance must be aimed at maximizing “societal wealth over the long term”).
106. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Abstention Doctrine, supra note 6, at 84; Blair & Stout,
Team Production, supra note 5, at 743; Ibrahim, supra note 6, at 947-48; Mitchell,
Trust, supra note 23, at 188-89; Pinto, supra note 3, at 266; Ribstein, supra note 25, at
198; Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 4, at 740-48.
107. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 58, at 143 (stating that “the criteria for good corporate law are limited to a single overriding goal: facilitating the maximization of shareholder wealth”). See also Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 104, at 599 (describing as a
critical fact for the intellectual vigor of corporate law that “all of the interesting and
challenging issues involve the resolution of conflicts between corporate participants”).
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fairness (distributive justice); 108
• market liberalism (private liberty) and utilitarianism (social
utility); 109 and
• the dialectics between the private/internal/market and the
public/external/regulatory spheres of institutional power
over the governance of the corporation (market and polity). 110
Arguably, these macrodichotomies shape both the substance and the
objectives of corporate law (as they also shape the substance and objectives of all other fields of law that we consider to be ‘private law’).
Each of them is replicated, en miniature, in the interdependence between
the two microdichotomies of corporate governance—namely, (i) the
fundamental agency problem of managerial primacy (the allocation of
control with, and the resultant discretion of, corporate decisionmakers) 111 and shareholder/stakeholder primacy (the allocation of controlling
property and/or contract rights with, and the resultant accountability to,
specific firm participants), 112 and (ii) shareholder wealth (maximum
market value) and stakeholder welfare (maximum societal value). 113
Descriptively, these three macrodichotomies relate to each other as set
forth in Figure 2.

108. See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort
Law of Accidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 194-95 (2000); Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective
Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 349, 349 (2002) [hereinafter Weinrib, Corrective Justice]; Ernest J. Weinrib, Liberty, Community, and Corrective Justice, 1 CAN.
J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 3, 4-5 (1988); Richard W. Wright, The Principles of Justice, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1859, 1868, 1890-92 (2000).
109. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 9, at 1396; Romano, supra note 1, at 926.
110. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Primacy, supra note 12, at 549; Bratton, supra note 3, at
202; Richter, supra note 5, at 177 (describing Douglass North’s concept of new institutional economics of history as aiming “at a general theory of the interaction between
polity and economy”).
111. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 5, at 743; Shleifer &
Vishny, supra note 4, at 740-48.
112. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 58, at 143 (stating that “the criteria for good corporate law are limited to a single overriding goal: facilitating the maximization of shareholder wealth”); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 58, at 18 (“As a normative matter,
the overall objective of corporate law—as any branch of law—is presumably to serve
the interest of society as a whole.”).
113. Cf. Allen, supra note 12, at 264-65; Fisch, supra note 10, at 639-40.
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Figure 2
Plotting Jurisprudential Macrodichotomies

First, the firm can be seen as merely a result of private-party initiative and market competition. Accordingly, corporate law, as the enabling framework 114 for such private-party initiative and its participation in
the marketplace, is a means to support a free-enterprise system where
private parties should be at liberty to order their economic affairs as they
see fit and without any regulatory intervention. 115 Collectively, all such
incidents of private-party contractarian and/or transactional ordering
combine to create—at least, in theory—Adam Smith’s “invisible hand of
the market.” 116 In other words, market forces control.
This jurisprudential source of liberalism (its battle cry is freedom), 117 however, immediately needs to be juxtaposed with utilitarianism (the battle cry of which is efficiency). 118 Under utilitarianism, hie114.
115.
116.

Allen, supra note 9, at 1400; Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1608, 1617.
Cf. Allen, supra note 9, at 1396.
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 3 (1776) (Cannan ed. 1904), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/
Smith/smWN13.html. See Rock & Wachter, supra note 5, at 1697.
117. Or human liberty in order to fend off the great evil of an oppressive, leviathan
state. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 9, at 1396.
118. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 108, at 1868-71. See also Lawrence E. Mitchell,
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rarchical forces control. Going back to Jeremy Bentham’s definition of
social utility as the principle of achieving the greatest possible happiness
for the greatest possible number of people, 119 the corporate entity can also be subjected to general welfare concerns (i.e., it can be regarded as a
vehicle to foster the common good). 120 The problem of social utility of
corporations is at the core of one of the three standard agency (cost)
problems created by the corporate entity—namely, the interest conflicts
between firm participants and outside parties. 121 Since Ronald Coase’s
famous explanation of the nature of firms in 1937 (as further elaborated
by Oliver Williamson in his “markets and hierarchies” research program 122), 123 we know that the corporate structuration must be eternally
Vulnerability and Efficiency (of What?), 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 153, 153-54, 159 (2005)
(“The obvious candidate to serve as a metric of good corporate law is the efficient production of goods and services.”).
119. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 9 (1780) (Pickering 1823). See also Wright, supra note 108, at 1868.
120. Cf. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 58 (“As a normative matter, the overall
objective of corporate law—as any branch of law—is presumably to serve the interest
of society as a whole.”); Thomas, supra note 59, at 135 (“It strikes me that the overall
goal of good corporate law should be to assist private parties to create wealth for themselves and the economy in a manner that does not inflict uncompensated negative externalities upon third parties.”).
121. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 22. The other two standard agency (cost) problems created by the corporate entity are between managers and investors
(as discussed supra) and between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.
Id.
122. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975); Oliver E. Williamson, The Logic of Economic Organization, 4 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 65, 88 (1988) (arguing the existence of “three generic
forms of governance – market, hybrid, and hierarchy”). See also Bernard Baudry &
David Gindis, The V-Network Form: Economic Organization and the Theory of the
Firm 1 (October 10, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=795244; Powell, supra
note 62, at 297. See also Meurer, supra note 53, at 729-30; Rock & Wachter, supra
note 5, at 1631.
123. Coase, supra note 99, at 386, 388, 393 (asking “in view of the fact that it is
usually argued that coordination will be done by the price mechanism, why is such organization necessary?” and then explaining that “[the] firm …consists of the system of
relationships which comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent
on an entrepreneur.”). See COX & HAZEN, supra note 3, at 40; Allen, supra note 9, at
1398; Dooley, supra note 6, at 464; Mark Granovetter, Business Groups, in THE
HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 454, 454 (Neil J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg
eds., 2000); Meurer, supra note 53, at 737; Powell, supra note 62, at 296-97; Rock &
Wachter, supra note 5, at 1621. See also Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The
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stuck in this first macrodichotomy between market/freedom and hierarchy/efficiency. The corporation shelters private-party entrepreneurial
activity from market forces and higher transaction costs by providing an
efficient vehicle for pooling investments and subjecting those to a central command-and-control structure. 124
A second macrodichotomy exists between the Aristotelean notions
of corrective justice (its battle cry is rectification) 125 and concerns of distributive justice (the battle cry of which is fairness). 126 In Book V of his
Nicomachean Ethics, 127 Aristotle formulated these two concepts of justice that remain central to contemporary theories of private law. 128 Corrective (or commutative 129 or interactive 130) justice focuses on bipolar
relations and correlativity. 131 Fiduciary duties owed by directors to the
corporation provide an example of such bipolar relations within corporate governance. Fiduciary duties are seen as delictual obligations (i.e.,

Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J.
POL. ECON. 691, 692 (1986) (differentiating between specific rights and residual rights
in order to explain firm boundaries); Oliver D. Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and
the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119, 1119 (1990) (setting forth a framework
for addressing the question of “when transactions should be carried out within the firm
and when through the market”).
124. See also Bainbridge, Competing Concepts, supra note 13, at 81; Bainbridge,
Primacy, supra note 12, at 555; O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur, supra note 3, at 759; Rock
& Wachter, supra note 9, at 1617. Cf. ERIC HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EXTREMES 103
(1994) (describing how intellectuals and policy makers early in the 20th century already
observed that an economy dominated by huge corporations made nonsense of the term
‘perfect competition’).
125. Keating, supra note 108, at 195; Weinrib, Corrective Justice, supra note 108, at
350.
126. Or equality (which both are the same word in Greek). See Weinrib, Corrective
Justice, supra note 108, at 349. See also Keating, supra note 108, at 200.
127. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book V, Chapters 2-4 (W. D. Ross trans.,
Clarendon Press, 1908) (384 B.C.E.) available at http://www.ilt.columbia.edu/
publications/Projects/digitexts/aristotle/nicomachean_ethics/book05.html.
128. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, supra note 108, at 349.
129. Cees Maris, A ≠ A: Or, Freaky Justice , 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1133, 1152-53
(2010).
130. Wright, supra note 108, at 1883.
131. Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 53, 66-67 (David G. Owen ed., 1995); Keating, supra note
108, at 197; Weinrib, Corrective Justice, supra note 108, at 351; Ernest J. Weinrib,
Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice, 2
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 107, 110, 117 (2001); Weinrib, supra note 108, at 5.
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their breach resonates in tort, not in contract). 132 The basic idea is that
parties to bipolar relations have an original, notional equality relative to
their transactions/interactions with each other. 133 If one party breaches
such state of equality, liability of that party is necessary to rectify the
transactional/interactive injustice inflicted to the other party. 134 Thus,
corrective justice is about the restoration of the parties’ original equality
relative to their transaction/interaction. 135
Distributive justice applies to multipolar relations. 136 An example
in corporate governance is the obligation of directors to act in the best
interest of the corporation, which requires allocative and distributive decisions with regard to all productive factors involved in the corporation
as a whole. Principles of distributive justice are normative principles
designed to allocate goods in limited supply relative to their demand by
various constituents. 137 The main concern is fair allocation and distribution of resources and wealth. 138 In Aristotelean terms, each party shall
receive according to her due. 139 Thus, the relative merit of each party in
a multipolar relationship (i.e., their proportional equality) matters. 140
Principles of distributive justice are thought to operate independent of
any individual interactions between the parties. The very nature of the
corporation as a vehicle to pool firm-specific investments from a wide
range of firm participants is obviously multipolar. Therefore, distributive justice concerns are immediately implicated. Nonetheless, the gist

132. See, e.g., ENEA v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 519 (Cal. Ct. App.
2005) (describing fiduciary duties as “delictual” duties “imposed by law” and that “their
breach sounds in tort”); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 887. But see, e.g., Alces, supra note 42, at 244
(“All fiduciary relationships are, at some level, contractual.”); id. at 270-71 (“Even
though all fiduciary relationships are contractual, not all contractual relationships are
fiduciary.”).
133. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, supra note 108, at 349.
134. Id.; Wright, supra note 108, at 1891.
135. Cf. Wright, supra note 108, at 1891.
136. Weinrib, supra note 131, at 117; Weinrib, Corrective Justice, supra note 108,
at 351-52.
137. Cf. Keating, supra note 108, at 200; Wright, supra note 108, at 1890.
138. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, supra note 108, at 349; Weinrib, supra note 108,
at 4; Wright, supra note 108, at 1890.
139. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, supra note 108, at 349; Maris, supra note 129, at
1152. Similarly, distributive justice requires that equal cases be treated equally and unequal cases be treated unequally. See id. at 1133-34, 1152.
140. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, supra note 108, at 349.
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of corporate law dealing with the microtheoretical problems of the firm,
namely the two fundamental questions of corporate governance discussed above, operates in paradigms of bipolar relations (i.e., in paradigms of corrective justice). Only in the rare case of an unignorable
third relation (e.g., a hostile takeover predator) has corporate law been
forced to explicitly acknowledge multipolarity and to deal (or, shall we
say, struggle) with its fallout. 141
Both macrodichotomies discussed so far combine into a third, overarching macrodichotomy that has been developed by two main representatives of new institutional economics (“NIE”): Oliver Williamson,
on the one hand, who established the field of transaction cost economics
(“TCE”), which may be viewed as a microeconomic study of markets
and firms, 142 and Douglass North, on the other hand, who established the
field of new institutional economics of history (“NIEH”), which may be
viewed as a macroeconomic analysis of markets and firms. 143 TCE, in

141. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955-56 (Del.
1985); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc. 571 A.2d 1140, 1143-44 (Del. 1989).
Compare Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1985). In general, see, e.g., Margaret M. Blair, Reforming Corporate Governance: What History Can Teach Us, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 1-3 (2004); Lyman Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 2215, 2245-48 (1992); Lyman Johnson, New Approaches to Corporate Law, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1713, 1715-17 (1993); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1203-04 (2002).
142. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS, supra note 122; OLIVER E.
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985); Oliver E. Williamson, Introduction to THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND
DEVELOPMENT 3 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 1991); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22
J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics Meets
Posnerian Law and Economics, 149 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 99 (1993); Oliver
E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Precursors, in REGULATION,
DEREGULATION, REREGULATION: INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Claude Ménard & Michel Ghertman eds., 2009); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory, in ORGANIZATION THEORY: FROM CHESTER BARNARD TO THE
PRESENT AND BEYOND (Oliver E. Williamson ed. 1995); Oliver E. Williamson, Why
Law, Economics, and Organization?, in THE ORIGINS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: ESSAYS
BY THE FOUNDING FATHERS (Francesco Parisi & Charles K. Rowley eds., 2005). See
also Allen, supra note 9, at 1399; Richter, supra note 5, at 174-75.
143. See, e.g., LANCE E. DAVIS & DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH (1971); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND
CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY (1981); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,
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the Williamsonian tradition, focuses on arrangements made essentially
between two actors 144 and deals with the transfer or administration of
what economists call “private goods.” 145 Those goods (e.g., a contract)
are seen as the result of individual action. 146 TCE mainly ignores protolegal variables (e.g., norms, customs, mores, or traditions) as unalterable
givens since they are located at the top level of social analysis, namely
the “social embeddedness level” at which institutions “change very
slowly—on the order of centuries or millennia.” 147 Contrastingly, NIEH
concentrates on the “formal and informal institutional constraints which
control the behavior of more than two actors.” 148 Its focus is the provision or administration of what economists call “public goods.” 149 Such
goods (e.g., a corporation) are the result of collective action. 150 NIEH
explicitly accounts for protolegal variables since the “public good” is
seen as “nothing more nor less than the comprehensive system of cognitive and moral beliefs called ideology.” 151 Protolegal variables thus impact (if not control, as argued under the absolute director primacy mod-

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (James Alt & Douglass C.
North eds., 1990); DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT PAUL THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE
WESTERN WORLD: A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY (1973); Douglass C. North, Government
and the Cost of Exchange, 44 J. ECON. HIST. 255 (1984); Douglass C. North, Institutional Change and Economic Growth, 31 J. ECON. HIST. 118 (1971); Douglass C. North,
Structure and Performance: The Task of Economic History, 16 J. ECON. LITERATURE
963 (1978) [hereinafter North, Structure and Performance]; Douglass C. North & Robert Paul Thomas, The Rise and Fall of the Manorial System: A Theoretical Model, 31
J. ECON. HIST. 777 (1971). See also Richter, supra note 5, at 173-76.
144. Oliver E. Williamson, The Evolving Science of Organization, 149 J. INST. &
THEORETICAL ECON. 36, 56 (1993) (“Transaction cost economics mainly works out a
dyadic set-up.”).
145. Richter, supra note 5, at 178.
146. Id.
147. Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking
Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 595, 596 (2000). The social embeddedness level, according to Williamson, includes informal institutions, customs, tradition, norms and religion. Id. at 596. See also Richter, supra note 5, at 178 (“norms, customs, mores, tradition and so forth”).
148. Richter, supra note 5, at 178.
149. Id. See also Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy:
The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1643, 1657 (1996); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Understanding Norms, 49 U. TORONTO L.J.
177, 198-99 (1999) [hereinafter Mitchell, Norms].
150. Richter, supra note 5, at 178.
151. North, Structure and Performance, supra note 143, at 973.
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el) the provision and administration of public goods.
In the light of such macrodichotomy, it seems possible to say the
corporation is both a private good (or the result of a concert of private
goods—namely, “contracts”) and a public good. However, given the
necessary multitude of productive resources pooled within the firm, the
more essential nature of a corporation appears to be multipolar, thus, as
a public good. 152
B. NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES
Macrotheoretical models of the firm have another very simple factual raison d’être: every productive endeavor by humans—as strictly
secondary producers—generates costs. 153 Indeed, from a holistic, planetary perspective, modern humans are a frivolity of nature. 154 All modern
human activity is ultimately exogenous and constitutes a net loss of natural resources compared to the ex-ante state of human activity. 155 We
consume enormous amounts of high-grade, low-entropy energy and resources extracted from the ecosphere in order to produce and maintain
something (including the consumption of matter-energy in the fairly
small amounts we inevitably need to constantly sustain and regenerate
ourselves). 156 In total amounts, these exercises of human production and
maintenance result in a smaller total amount of available low-entropy
matter-energy than was available on this planet before its transformation
and consumption for purposes of human production and maintenance. 157
152. In this regard, the firm not only resembles a nexus of contractual or quasicontractual arrangements linking rational firm participants but a social institution within
which firm participants form cooperative relationships for purposes of production and
value creation. See, e.g., Mitchell, Trust and Team, supra note 50, at 870; Blair &
Stout, Team Production, supra note 5, at 748.
153. Cf. Sheehy, supra note 59, at 17.
154. Cf. Kysar, supra note 104, at 14 (“[A]lthough animals do grow in size and species do evolve in complexity, in actuality their physical growth and adaptation exacts a
higher cost in terms of pure matter-energy than their new forms represent.”).
155. Cf. HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 35 (1996) (“The macroeconomy is an open subsystem of the ecosystem
and is totally dependent upon it, both as a source for inputs of low-entropy matterenergy and as a sink for outputs of high-entropy matter-energy.”); Kysar, supra note
104, at 35; Sheehy, supra note 59, at 17 n.57.
156. Cf. Kysar, supra note 104, at 22.
157. Cf. Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, The Entropy Law and the Economic Problem,
reprinted in VALUING THE EARTH: ECONOMICS, ECOLOGY, ETHICS 75, 80 (Herman E.
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At the same time, these exercises of human production and maintenance
also result in high-entropy outputs that the ecosystem has to assume and
regenerate. Thus, in terms of total amounts of energy and resources
available, modern man’s existence is always wasteful and, thus, never
genuinely productive. 158 “Wealth/value” and “wealth/value creation”
are therefore mere fictions fabricated by human beings.
Correspondingly, any perceived “wealth” we are generating in absolute terms is the result of destroying a much larger amount of natural
capital. To make it look good (and to ignore that we consume and destroy the only natural capital available to us faster and more systematically than our natural capital has time and resources to regenerate and to
continue maintaining us), the trick is to simply ignore and not account
for the costs that are the necessary and principal ingredient in order to
generate “wealth.” Focusing on the “wealth” so produced, and simultaneously ignoring, or at least, downplaying, the associated costs of wealth
production, results in a virtual, reality-denying net gain, rather than in
the actual and very real total loss that modern human “wealth” creation
inevitably generates. 159
Thus, the inescapable problems of all modern human activity, including in the form of the corporate endeavor, are negative externalities

Daly & Kenneth N. Townsend eds., 1993) (explaining that “the cost of any biological or
economic enterprise is always greater than the product”); Kysar, supra note 104, at 25.
158. And we are starting to run on empty, i.e., to exceed the “carrying capacity” of
the only ecosystem available to us. Kenneth E. Boulding, The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth (1966), reprinted in VALUING THE EARTH: ECONOMICS, ECOLOGY,
ETHICS 297, 303 (Herman E. Daly & Kenneth N. Townsend eds., 1993) (“The closed
economy of the future might similarly be called the ‘spaceman’ economy, in which the
earth has become a single spaceship, without unlimited reservoirs of anything, either for
extraction or for pollution, and in which, therefore, man must find his place in a cyclical
ecological system which is capable of continuous reproduction of material form even
though it cannot escape having inputs of energy.”); Kysar, supra note 104, at 27 (“Ecological economists, however, believe that humanity has now moved to the ‘spaceman
economy’ . . . , in which human productive capacity has outstripped the carrying capacity of the earth; that is, the binding constraint on material throughput is no longer our
capacity to produce, but the earth’s capacity to generate resource inputs and absorb
waste outputs.”) (footnote omitted).
159. See Kysar, supra note 104, at 29 (“Current national accounting measures produce a variety of results that would strike noneconomists as odd. . . . Social as well as
ecological costs frequently appear as gains under GNP accounting.”); Sheehy, supra
note 59, at 17 n.57.
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(i.e., social costs). 160 As has been pointed out some time ago, “[o]ne of
the most fateful errors of our age is the belief that ‘the problem of production’ has been solved.” 161 Indeed, “[a]ll economic activity must necessarily involve a step, however small, toward the exhaustion of available energy.” 162 Thus, “[i]nfinite growth in a finite environment is an
obvious impossibility.” 163
Against this backdrop, shareholder wealth can no longer be equated
with social welfare—nor can firm value any longer be equated with social value. 164 They are dichotomous. The simple reason for such dichotomy is that firm value is inevitably associated with social costs.
Firms create perceived “value” to a large extent by externalizing the
negative aspects of their value production exercises to outside factors
(third parties, the environment, etc.). 165 The greater the concentration of
economic power of a firm, in particular in the form of the modern Berle160. See Thomas, supra note 59, at 135 (“It strikes me that the overall goal of good
corporate law should be to assist private parties to create wealth for themselves and the
economy in a manner that does not inflict uncompensated negative externalities upon
third parties.”). The concept of externalities was introduced in economic discourse by
Arthur Pigou in 1920. ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 149-179
(1920) (discussing the concept of externalities in markets). See also R.H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 28-29 (1960); Kysar, supra note 104, at 9;
Sheehy, supra note 59, at 17 n.57. For a general discussion of the concept of externalities, see, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 77-109
(2004).
161. E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL – ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE
MATTERED 1 (1973) (Hartley & Marks 1999).
162. Kysar, supra note 104, at 15. See also Georgescu-Roegen, supra note 157, at
85 (“Every time we produce a Cadillac, we irrevocably destroy an amount of low entropy that could otherwise be used for producing a plow or a spade. In other words, every
time we produce a Cadillac, we do it at the cost of decreasing the number of human
lives in the future. Economic development through industrial abundance may be a
blessing for us now and for those who will be able to enjoy it in the near future, but it is
definitely against the interest of the human species as a whole, if its interest is to have a
lifespan as long as it is compatible with its dowry of low entropy.”).
163. SCHUMACHER, supra note 161, at 33. See also Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of
the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968) (“Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked
into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit—in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursing his own best
interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.”). Cf. Kysar, supra note 104, at 22.
164. Cf. Allen, supra note 12, at 264-65; Fisch, supra note 10, at 639-40; Ribstein,
supra note 31, at 1433-34.
165. Coase, supra note 160, at 1.
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Means corporation, the larger the potential for negative externalities
(i.e., social costs). 166 Many of those externalities remain unaccounted
for and, in particular, unreported. 167
The three fundamental macrodichotomies discussed above, and the
eternal problem of externalities, not only affect but define the acquired
interest preferences of our libertarian, free-enterprise-oriented society, 168
and, thus, of our private law, corporate law, and law of corporate governance. Collectively, they can be defined as protolegal per se. In other
words, we have reached the macrotheoretical core of directorial decisionmaking in the absence of any effective legal constraints under our
American corporate law. This macrotheoretical core of protolegal concerns provides American corporate law with a principal range of ultimately dialectic jurisprudential foundations that insolubly remain in conflict. They therefore, must find their way, and somehow translate, into
the individual moral compass of every human being, including, as is of
interest here, the respective individual moral compasses of corporate directors. 169 This is where things inevitably become slippery 170 and where
we move beyond the outer fringes of, and transcend, those models of the
firm that are artificially centered around assumptions (or test conditions)
of rational choice, zero transaction costs, perfect information and observable and verifiable calculative behavior of individual (including directorial) actors. 171

166.
167.

Cf. Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 3, at 310.
See, e.g., Michael R. Siebecker, Trust & Transparency: Promoting Efficient
Corporate Disclosure Through Fiduciary-Based Discourse, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 115,
128-36 (2009); Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and
Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999); Cynthia A. Williams
& John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American
Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493 (2005).
168. Cf. O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur, supra note 3, at 754; Klein, supra note 84, at
16. The classical and then neoclassical economic position is that the political, economic
and legal systems need to provide (i) strong legal protection of the entrepreneur’s property right to own and control productive assets, as well as (ii) strict limits on the power
of state actors to regulate and control economic activity. See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, The
Theory of the Firm Revisited, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND
DEVELOPMENT 159, 159-60 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 1993).
169. Cf. Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12 (“internal gyroscope”).
170. Cf. Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1697, 1699 (1996); Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 9.
171. See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 168, at 161 (“The only management task that
seems to remain, and which is the focus of attention in the firm of traditional price
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IV. THE MACROTHEORETICAL CORE: NORMS AND
SELF-ENFORCING CONTRACTS
Pursuant to the absolute director primacy model, directorial decisionmaking power is absolute. 172 Directors have complete discretion to
make corporate decisions by fiat and without any legal accountability for
the substance of their decisions (as long as there is no implication of
self-interest). Directorial behavior based on unrestricted power is, thus,
completely opportunistic. This represents the core dilemma of the absolute director primacy model and requires an inquiry into the protolegal
realm of directorial behavior.
By this, I mean the following: economists, simply but profoundly
(and both in equal measures), explain individual economic choice and
behavior dialectically as the confrontation of preferences or tastes and
theory, is the selection of profit-maximizing quantities of outputs and inputs. But, since
the required information for doing this is also freely at hand, and the required calculations are costless to make, the model strips management of any meaningful productivity
in the performance of even these tasks. The cost of maximizing is ignored or implicitly
assumed to be zero. De facto, the resources that might be required to make maximizing
decisions are treated as if they are not scarce.”) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original); Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 596; Ripken, supra note 33, at 165; Sheehy,
supra note 59, at 22. See also ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THEORY AND PRACTICE 53-55 (1990) (summarizing the
assumptions underlying neoclassical economic theory, including (i) that economic actors always behave rationally and in a self-interested manner, and (ii) that economic actors have complete and perfect information available in their pursuit of economic opportunities); North, Structure and Performance, supra note 143, at 964 (summarizing
the same assumptions as “(1) perfectly competitive markets, (2) perfectly specified and
costlessly enforced property rights, (3) neutral government, and (4) unchanging
tastes.”). The artifice of those test conditions (as well as their cumulative effect) has, of
course, been famously parodied by economist and Nobel laureate George Stigler in his
Conference Handbook. George J. Stigler, The Conference Handbook, 85 J. POL. ECON.
441 (1977). According to his Handbook, all we need to say here for support of the
point made above is “9-13-14-16-23-24-30” which numerical labels stand for, respectively: “The conclusions change if you introduce uncertainty.” “The market cannot, of
course, deal satisfactorily with that externality.” “But what if transaction costs are not
zero?” “Of course, if you allow for the investment in human capital, the entire picture
changes.” “The motivation of the agents in this theory is so narrowly egotistic that it
cannot possibly explain the behavior of real people.” “The flabby economic actor in
this impressionistic model should be replaced by the utility-maximizing individual.”
“The paper is rigidly confined by the paradigm of neoclassical economics, so large parts
of urgent reality are outside its comprehension.”
172. Reich-Graefe, supra note 10.
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opportunities. 173 If a director is faced with limitless opportunities (at
least, in principle), any attempt at modeling directorial behavior with
sufficient predictive ability requires the study of directorial preferences—namely, what they are, how they work and how such preferential system underlying directorial behavior comes about in the first
place. Given the apparent standardization, selective restriction and,
thus, decisional discipline of directorial behavior in the face of a limitless range of opportunities in the real world of corporate practice, we
will also need to study whether there exists a preferential phenomenology. Arguably, there must be a common core of protolegal implications
and foundations of interpersonal cooperation that not only applies to directorial decisionmaking but that repeatedly produces like outputs from
similar inputs so that we can arrive at explanations and models with (at
least, some) predictive accuracy—and without operating this process in
a black box.
Obviously, this is the “slippery” 174 realm of (supposedly) “ugly” 175

173. See, e.g., Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 1725; North, Structure and
Performance, supra note 143, at 963.
174. Posner, supra note 170, at 1699 (“The concept of a ‘norm’ is slippery, and
scholars use it in different ways.”); Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 9 (asking
“how can we gain a firm grasp on such soft and slippery concepts” as honor, integrity,
trustworthiness and responsibility).
175. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 104, at 604 n.21. Cf. Friedman, supra note
104 (arguing that “the doctrine of ‘social responsibility’ involves the acceptance of the
socialist view that political mechanisms, not market mechanisms, are the appropriate
way to determine the allocation of scarce resources to alternative uses”); Gilson, supra
note 58, at 147 (pointing out that “markets encourage a management and governance
structure that fits the corporation’s business” and that “[c]orporate law has nothing to
add to the process”). But cf. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 58 (“As a normative
matter, the overall objective of corporate law—as any branch of law—is presumably to
serve the interest of society as a whole.”); Mitchell, Trust and Team, supra note 50, at
870 (describing the understanding of corporate organization in terms of team production
not only as a “tale […] of economics alone” but also as “to conceive of the corporation
as a political institution” and “as a social institution”); Wallman, Understanding, supra
note 10, at 809-10 (concluding that corporate governance must be aimed at maximizing
“societal wealth over the long term”). To me, it is not clear what should be “ugly”
about this problem, other than that it perhaps taints the (perceived or aspired) purity and
sanctity of corporate theoretical models. I would simply argue that a pure (i.e., nonnormative) corporate law (or any law for that matter) does not—and, because it is a
complete human fiction anyhow, logically cannot—exist. The perceived ‘ugliness’
may, therefore, have more to do with personal attitudes and preferences (and I mean
this only descriptively); some observers simply may “get real ‘squirrelly,’” Lawrence
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normative research. 176 However, norms do matter. 177 Without an effective external (legal) constraint on directorial decisionmaking, it seems
necessary to explain the phenomenon of general investor confidence exante-investment in the face of absent director accountability ex-postinvestment by “something” else—namely, a repetitive internalization of
normative standards into directorial preferences with resulting standardized, normative decisional outputs. In other words, internal values manifested by the decisionmaking choices of directors made over and over
again (i.e., by personal preferences) drive directorial behavior. 178 Not
only then, do directors have preferences to adhere to normative standards, but their preferences affect aggregate behavior in equilibrium. 179
They coagulate into normative, protolegal variables that could help us
understand and explain why corporate governance works without corporate law constraints. Moreover, since the protolegal realm is significantly larger and richer than what has been—or, theoretically, can be—
distilled down from it into the legal vessels of corporate governance,
norms must have the central role (i.e., not just a supplementary role visà-vis corporate law) in achieving the objective of ex-ante determinability
of directorial behavior in the absence of ex-post-investment accountability constraints. 180
Put differently, one may argue that everything within corporate governance (magically) 181 works by itself and the law can sit back and stay

Raful, What Balance in Legal Education Means to Me: A Dissenting View, 60 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 135, 135 (2010), when they hear what must sound to them as being “diffuse” and
“confusing” at best (cf. Williamson, Calculativeness, supra note 85, at 469) or as being
“new age stuff” at worst (cf. Raful, supra). See also Kysar, supra note 104, at 22
(“More than one commentator has speculated that the disappearance of limits in macroeconomics serves as a theoretical expedient to avoid difficult questions of distribution.”); Lee, supra note 10, at 575 (“The terms ‘morality’ and ‘justice’ may raise red
flags for readers skeptical of deontology and inclined toward consequentialism.”);
Posner, supra note 170, at 1699 (“Norms are fuzzy.”). See also Mitchell, Norms, supra
note 149, at 203 (“Norms are fuzzy because people are fuzzy and life is fuzzy.”) (footnote omitted).
176. Cf. Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 596.
177. John C. Coffee, Jr., Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country Evaluation, 149 U.
PA. L. REV. 2151, 2175 (2001).
178. Cf. Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 1726.
179. Id. at 1726 .
180. Cf. id. at 1720.
181. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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out of it 182 since “we are blissfully in Nash equilibrium.” 183 Instead of a
corporate reality of opportunistic directorial shirking as the norm, we get
a corporate reality of directorial diligence, fairness, efficiency and competence as the norm because directors are committed to, and simply apply, their own, internalized normative agenda to the task at hand (i.e.,
making decisions in good faith and the reasonable belief that they are in
the best interest of the corporation). 184 In other words, corporate directors are “good” 185 Macbeths whose fiduciary obligation is entirely selfenforcing. 186

The service and the loyalty I owe,
In doing it, pays itself. Your highness’ part
Is to receive our duties: and our duties
Are, to your throne and state, children and servants;
Which do but what they should, by doing every thing
187
Safe toward your love and honour.

182. Cf. Langevoort, supra note 12, at 800 (“[T]he law played a relatively minor
role in the evolution of board structure and behavior . . . .”); Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Law Criteria: Law’s Relation to Private Ordering, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 95, 99
(2005) (“[L]aw defers to other regulators of human behavior when . . . alternative regulators have a relative advantage. . . . Law is humble.”). See also Gilson, supra note 58,
at 147 (“The point is that markets encourage a management and governance structure
that fits the corporation’s business. Corporate law has nothing to add to the process.”);
Mitchell, supra note 118 (“Law has its limits.”); id. at 165 (“Perhaps the best corporate
law is no law at all.”).
183. Bruce Chapman, Trust, Economic Rationality, and the Corporate Fiduciary
Obligation, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 547, 586 (1993). In game theory, a Nash equilibrium
designates a state in which no player can any longer improve her personal outcome/payoff through unilateral changes in her chosen game strategy. Id. at 586 n.74.
184. See Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 1723. See also Cooter, supra note
149, at 1661-63; Mitchell, Norms, supra note 149, at 197.
185. I am talking about the beginning of Shakespeare’s Macbeth, when the protagonist is bravely and unselfishly leading the Scottish defensive forces against the Norwegian intruders under Sweno, the King of Norway, and the original “Thane of Cawdor,” a Scottish defector and traitor fighting alongside the Norwegians. At such time,
Macbeth is not besieged by the lust for power (which we often euphemistically call
“control”) and greed (ditto: “wealth maximization”)—though Shakespeare already labels him “Bellona’s bridegroom” (i.e., as the husband of the goddess of war and as apparently already having replaced Mars, the god of war).
186. Cf. Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 614.
187. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act I sc. IV. Macbeth is addressing Duncan,
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If only we could find out how corporate directors attain and apply
their respective moral compasses; how they become and stay good selfenforcing Macbeths; and whether all of that indeed happens in today’s
corporate reality. We certainly are trying to figure this out, as the “slippery” realm of normative research is already under intense investigation188—both in the economic literature on norms in organizations
(usually rubricated under the heading of “self-enforcing” or “selfgoverning” contracts), 189 and in the focus of legal academia on the coexistence of (corporate) law and norms and the latter’s influence on
(and, maybe, over) the former (the so-called “law and norms” literature). 190
It certainly is already possible to come up with a (perhaps, necessarily eclectic) list of what could be called “protolegal prolegomena of
directorial accountability” that all seem part and parcel of the preferential phenomenology of “good” director conduct. Many of such prolegomena are concepts that, unsurprisingly, have become heavily reflected
within corporate law (indeed, within many other fields of private law).
The list includes (without limitation):
• trust 191 and trustworthiness; 192
King of Scotland, after leading the Scottish forces to victory during the battle at Fife.
Duncan is immensely grateful and states that “[m]ore is thy due than more than all can
pay” (to which Macbeth responds the above). Id. Banquo, a Scottish general who
fought alongside Macbeth, similarly responds to Duncan’s gratitude (which includes
promises of wealth and honor within the King’s embrace) with notions of duty, humility
and selflessness: “There if I grow, The harvest is your own.” Id.
188. Cf. Mitchell, Norms, supra note 149, at 179.
189. See, e.g., Hart, Norms and Theory, supra note 38, at 1703; Rock & Wachter,
supra note 9, at 1609; id. at 1613.
190. See, e.g., Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 1717; Jones, supra note 15, at
121-24; Kahan, supra note 5, at 1870; Rock & Wachter, supra note 60, at 434; Rock &
Wachter, supra note 5, at 1621. To give an example: Lawrence Mitchell has developed
a “trust model” of the firm, which centers around the breach of implicit ‘contracts’ by
corporate directors. Such ‘contracts’ embody the good faith expectations of various
firm constituencies. See Mitchell, Trust and Team, supra note 50, at 871, 899. See also
Wallman, Understanding, supra note 10, at 808 (mentioning “good faith expectations”
which employees and other affected communities “were told to trust”).
191. ARROW, supra note 28, at 23; Dent, supra note 10, at 1221; Hart, Norms and
Theory, supra note 38, at 1702; Mitchell, Trust and Team, supra note 50, at 870; Rock
& Wachter, supra note 9, at 1609. With regard to the norm of “trust,” Lawrence Mitchell describes the corporate law dilemma that is the topic of this Article well when he
states: “To trust is, in my own field of corporate law, to be willing to invest your money
in a corporation managed by people you have never seen, you have never met, about
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(good) faith 193 and faithfulness; 194
loyalty; 195
fairness; 196
guardianship 197 and duty; 198
sense of honor; 199
sense of obligation 200 and responsibility; 201
honesty (truthfulness) 202 and integrity; 203
confidence; 204
(moral) character 205 and decency; 206

whom you know very little, and some of whose names you may not know at all.” See
Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 599. See also Stout, Investor Confidence, supra
note 51, at 407-08.
192. Alces, supra note 42, at 241; Chapman, supra note 183, at 583; Hart, Norms
and Theory, supra note 38, at 1714; Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 597; Stout, Investor Confidence, supra note 51, at 416; Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 9.
193. Mitchell, Trust and Team, supra note 50, at 871, 899; Stout, Investor Confidence, supra note 51, at 411; Wallman, Understanding, supra note 10, at 808.
194. Cf. Johnson, supra note 63, at 5, 25-28; Meurer, supra note 53, at 740; Stout,
Mythical Benefits, supra note 57, at 797.
195. Mitchell, Trust and Team, supra note 50, at 870. See also Gambetta, supra note
85, at 218 n.9 (“Loyalty, in this context, can perhaps be seen as the maintenance of
global trust – in a person, a party, an institution – even in circumstances where local
disappointments might encourage its withdrawal.”) (emphasis in original).
196. Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, Trusting and Trustworthiness, 81 B.U. L.
REV. 523, 529 (2001); Hart, Norms and Theory, supra note 38, at 1703; Meurer, supra
note 53, at 744 (“fair dealing”); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate
Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425, 425-26 (1993) [hereinafter Mitchell, Fairness]; Stout, Investor
Confidence, supra note 51, at 424.
197. Bainbridge, Primacy, supra note 12, at 550-51 n.21 (“Platonic guardians”);
Cox & Munsinger, supra note 66, at 84 (“faithful guardians”).
198. Bainbridge, Primacy, supra note 12, at 550-51 n.21; Kahan, supra note 5, at
1870; Mitchell, Trust and Team, supra note 50, at 870.
199. Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 8.
200. Kahan, supra note 5, at 1872; Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 9.
201. Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 18.
202. Ben-Ner & Putterman, supra note 196, at 529 (“truth-telling”); Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 1723 (2001); Grossman, supra note 53, at 466; Hart, Norms
and Theory, supra note 38, at 1702.
203. Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 3, at 306; O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur,
supra note 3, at 767; Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 9.
204. Alces, supra note 42, at 241; O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur, supra note 3, at 769.
205. Ben-Ner & Putterman, supra note 196, at 528; Chapman, supra note 183, at
582; Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 1726; Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at
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• reputation, 207 prestige 208 and credibility; 209
• corporate culture; 210
• generosity 211 and altruism; 212 and
• affinity 213 and empathy. 214
These protolegal values and attributes form the very core of directorial legal (if only, aspirational) 215 mandates imposed by American corporate law. 216 I argue that a fully developed understanding of their re599; Stout, Investor Confidence, supra note 51, at 425; Stout, Proper Motives, supra
note 12, at 20.
206. Hart, Norms and Theory, supra note 38, at 1703; Lee, supra note 10, at 572.
207. Ben-Ner & Putterman, supra note 196, at 527-28; Dooley, supra note 6, at 525;
Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 1721; Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 3,
at 306; Hart, Norms and Theory, supra note 38, at 1714; Meurer, supra note 53, at 74245; Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1613; Smith, supra note 50, at 969; Stout, Proper
Motives, supra note 12, at 7.
208. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 66, at 94; Elhauge, supra note 35, at 752.
209. Chapman, supra note 183; Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1611.
210. Meurer, supra note 53, at 745; Ripken, supra note 33, at 133-38; Rock &
Wachter, supra note 5, at 1642; Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1608. Other synonyms may be used for this “norm” including “being, core, . . . ethos, identity, ideology,
manner, patterns, philosophy, purpose, roots, spirit, style, vision, and way.” STANLEY
M. DAVIS, MANAGING CORPORATE CULTURE 1 n.1 (1984).
211. Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 1723.
212. Ben-Ner & Putterman, supra note 196, at 529; Blair & Stout, Trustworthiness,
supra note 5, at 1809-10 (“concern for others”); George W. Dent, Jr., Race, Trust, Altruism and Reciprocity, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1001, 1001 (2005) [hereinafter Dent,
Race]; Jones, supra note 15, at 125; Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 1, 12.
213. Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 608, 615 (describing how the importance of
being able to trust a partner in a fiduciary relationship, and the importance of being
trustworthy, can rise to the level of the intimacy of marriage itself).
214. Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 608.
215. Bainbridge, Abstention Doctrine, supra note 6, at 89 n.37; Garza, supra note
14, at 629; Ibrahim, supra note 6, at 934; Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 613-14;
Rock, supra note 14, at 1015; Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1608. See also Rock &
Wachter, Corporate Law as a Facilitator, supra note 14, at 529. (“[O]ne should think
of fiduciary duty cases as judicial sermons that exhort managers to consummate performance and that criticize those who perform below expectations, even if, or perhaps
especially when, no direct legal sanction is imposed.”) (footnote omitted).
216. Cf. Alces, supra note 42, at 241 (“Beneficiaries want to rely on someone else’s
expertise and think it is in their best interests to trust, rather than directly control, the
fiduciary. This focus on trust rather than direct monitoring or control is the hallmark of
fiduciary law.”); Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 597; id. at 614 (“Fiduciary duty is,
famously, about trust.”); Rock, supra note 14, at 1097 (“[F]iduciary duty law evolves
primarily at the level of norms rather than the level of rules.”). See also Luhmann,
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spective operation in the black box of corporate governance constitutes a
first step in the process of unveiling the truly controlling variables behind observable, standardized and compliant director behavior, on the
one hand, and absolute director primacy in a world without effective legal means for director accountability, on the other hand.

V. THE MACROTHEORETICAL DILEMMA:
NORM ACTUATION UNEXPLAINED
Each macrotheoretical model that reverts—by definition—to some
of the above normative concerns (and, thus, allows directorial selfexpectations and moral standards to enter the modeling equation) must
explain how these protolegal foundations of interpersonal relationships
and cooperation, in the reality of corporate governance, become actuated
in directorial decisionmaking behavior. Such explanation of norm actuation also must unveil the forces and devices employed in order to (i)
deploy norms and foster norm perception with general latency and
command (i.e., “this is—under any and all circumstances—the generally
expected and accepted behavior of a corporate director”) 217 and (ii) actuate norms with precise specificity and command (i.e., “this is the
‘proper,’ hence acceptable and expected, directorial behavior under
these particularized circumstances”). Those forces and devices, furthermore, must be extremely powerful, 218 as well as extremely efficient,
in order to sufficiently discipline and standardize individualistic (if not,
opportunistic) directorial behavior naturally faced with a limitless spectrum 219 of decisional opportunities and options. How else to guarantee
both the vast repetition of “proper” directorial behavior and the limited
instances and variety of “improper” directorial behavior (i.e., misbeha-

Familiarity, supra note 51, at 94 (discussing Bernhard Barber’s differentiation of “three
dimensions in which trusting expectations may fail” and including therein as one dimension “the fiduciary obligations of actors, that is, their duty and their motives to
place the interests of others before their own;” BERNHARD BARBER, THE LOGIC AND
LIMITS OF TRUST (1983)).
217. Cf. Blair & Stout, Trustworthiness, supra note 5, at 1798. Norm actuation
seems to occur with vast amounts of standardized normative repetition and relatively
marginal instances of normative deviation from the standard, both within individual directors and among the whole spectrum of corporate boards.
218. Cf. Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 602.
219. Cf. Mitchell, Trust, supra note 23, at 190.
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vior) that we seem to be able to observe within the marketplaces of corporate reality?
Two realms exist in which norm actuation may happen. 220 The first
realm is based on technique and perception (i.e., norm actuation is “cognitive-based”), while the second realm is based on internalization and
authenticity (i.e., norm actuation is “affect-based”). 221 With regard to
the former, corporate directors may have a fairly standardized perception
of what is expected of them and how they need to behave to meet such
external expectations and, accordingly, to make themselves look good
(both before others and before themselves). 222 The actuation of normative concerns within directorial decisionmaking may therefore be merely
intuitive, unconscious and reflexive (i.e., not much, if any, thought is
given to what the “right” behavior should be, because it naturally “feels”
to fall in line with standard and generally accepted behavior of directors
and, thus, feels appropriate 223). 224 Alternatively, norm actuation as part

220.
221.

Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 1722.
See, e.g., the distinction usually made in organizational psychology between
cognitive-based trust (which is based on the knowledge and recognition of the fiduciary’s reliability, dependability, and competence) and affect-based trust (which depends on the investment and reciprocation of the fiduciary’s genuine care and concern
for the welfare of others); see Burke & Stets, supra note 26, at 361-62; Daniel J. McAllister, Affect- and Cognition-Based Trust as Foundations for Interpersonal Cooperation
in Organizations, 38 ACAD. OF MGMT J. 24, 25-26 (1995); Mitchell, Trusted, supra note
13, at 608.
222. This cognitive process is usually described as “self-verification.” See Burke &
Stets, supra note 26, at 347. See also Cox & Munsinger, supra note 66, at 94
(“Through attachment to a group, especially one of high prestige, individuals satisfy
their needs to validate their self-worth, particularly by the group’s feedback.”). Warren
Buffet once described this cognitive process as “elephant bumping” (Warren E. Buffet,
et al., Hostile Takeovers and Junk Bond Financing: A Panel Discussion, in JOHN C.
COFFEE ET AL., KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE
TAKEOVER 10, 14 (1988) (“I mean [corporate leaders] like to go to the places where
other elephants are, because it reaffirms the fact that when they look around the room
and they see all these other elephants that they must be an elephant too, or why would
they be there?”).
223. Cf. Blair & Stout, Trustworthiness, supra note 5, at 1798.
224. Such reflexive adherence—i.e., directors intuitively and unquestioningly believe in a particular norm—might, for example, explain the prevalence of shareholder
value constructs in the corporate governance debate. In other words, shareholder value
is believed to be a norm in itself that reflexively and self-referentially replicates itself.
Cf. Kaushik Basu, Social Norms and the Law, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, 476, 477 (2002) (describing how certain norms stop us
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of directorial behavior may be deliberate, calculative and instrumental
(i.e., behavior is purposefully structured to signal 225 to others that a particular normative agenda is at play and controlling the decisionmaking—
whether that is indeed the case or not). 226 In the latter variant, where the
normative directorial footprint becomes part of the firm’s social capital, 227 it would be possible, at least in theory, to employ techniques to
develop a regime of firm-specific norms (for example, norms of a firm
that require fair conduct by its agents) 228 that can then be signaled to
markets in order to build (additional) social capital in the form of reputational net gains.
Furthermore, with regard to external motivational forces behind directorial behavior, it is possible to link this first realm of norm actuation
with the remedial side of ex-post social sanctions (as opposed to nonexistent legal sanctions), such as guilt, disapprobation and other shaming
exercises229 that, in the case of noncompliance with norms, would lead
to reputational net losses 230 and, in the case of normative compliance,
would lead to net gains in reputation (i.e., to being perceived as a good
moral actor and conscientious corporate director). 231 Fear of shaming
“from doing certain things or choosing certain options, irrespective of how much utility
that thing or option gives us”); Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 1723; Elhauge,
supra note 35, at 752.
225. Cf. Gambetta, supra note 85, at 216 (“The problem, therefore, is essentially one
of communication: even if people have perfectly adequate motives for cooperation they
still need to know about each other’s motives and to trust each other, or at least the effectiveness of their motives. It is necessary not only to trust others before acting cooperatively, but also to believe that one is trusted by others.”) (emphasis in original).
226. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 177, at 2152; Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 61,
at 1722; Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 597. See also Lee, supra note 10, at 572
(“People act morally because their utility responds to ‘social and moral sanctions.’”).
227. Cf. Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 596-97; Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust,
81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 567-68 (2001) [hereinafter Ribstein, Law v. Trust].
228. Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 1719.
229. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 35, at 752; Ribstein, Law v. Trust, supra note
227, at 564; Rock, supra note 14, at 1104; David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate
Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1814-15 (2001).
230. See, e.g., Rock & Wachter, supra note 60, at 430.
231. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 15, at 108; Meurer, supra note 53, at 744 (“Reputation works in the larger commercial community to promote efficient performance.”);
Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 7. With regard to the norm of “trust,” Lawrence Mitchell has described this process well when he defines “trust” as follows: “To
be trusted is to be held accountable for the trust reposed by the truster, to be held to a
standard of behavior that allows these very important relationships to form and be sus-
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and the personal non-comfort or pain of feeling guilty will make directors stay the line of “proper” decisional behavior (at least, in an overwhelming majority of cases) by internally monitoring—either reflexively or calculatively—their external perception. 232
The second realm of norm actuation is more difficult to describe
because it abstracts entirely from common neoclassical approaches to
managerial behavior—namely calculated “carrots” (i.e., external rewards) or calculated “sticks” (i.e., external sanctions). 233 This realm is
not about external incentives or pressures influencing directorial decisionmaking. 234 It is about neither sticks nor carrots, but about internal
pressures that may be prevalent in a given director’s moral psychology 235 and, thus, may influence (if not, overwrite) any opportunistic behavioral tendencies of such director. The argument goes like this: from
the perspective of an investor, “a fair degree of reliance” 236 on the
soundness, fairness and diligence of directorial behavior ex-ante (in order to allow for firm-specific investments to be made with confidence)
may be—and, maybe, even should be—the result of “correct” ex-ante
directorial internalizations of moral imperatives. 237 In other words, directors act (or, at least, attempt to act) with authenticity and as genuine
moral actors, thereby avoiding all moral hazards that would otherwise
allow them to shirk on their performance, since they would not be run-

tained, and to be held responsible by social approbation, feelings of failure and guilt,
and sometimes by law if that trust reposed is breached. Perhaps most importantly, to be
trusted is to be told that we are trustworthy. And to be told that we are trustworthy demands that we behave at a level that reflects that gift.” See Mitchell, Trusted, supra
note 13, at 599.
232. Cf. Kahan, supra note 5, at 1870; Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 340 (1997); Mitchell, Trusted,
supra note 13, at 616. See also Lee, supra note 10, at 572 (“In other words, in addition
to the utility they derive from the satisfaction of their own interests, individuals derive
positive utility from praise and feelings of virtue and they experience disutility from
criticism and feelings of guilt.”) (footnote omitted).
233. Cf. Grossman, supra note 53, at 466; Stout, Investor Confidence, supra note 51,
at 425; Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 4.
234. Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 8.
235. See Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 602.
236. ARROW, supra note 28, at 23.
237. See Blair & Stout, Trustworthiness, supra note 5, at 1794; Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1258-61 (1999);
Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 597; id. 602; Rock, supra note 14, at 1013; Stout,
Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 18.
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ning any risk of legal repercussions or social sanctions. They do this
simply by way of internalized, normative reactions. Corporate directors
are (pre-)conditioned to behave well. 238 To conveniently avoid any need
for applicable legal constraints, all we need to do is detect and select
(and know how to detect and select) the good moral agents who will
have such internalized, normative reactions. 239 Therefore, this second
realm of norm actuation is less dependent on ex-post external sanctions
(social or legal). Rather, it emphasizes ex-ante internalized social behavior in corporate directors (which may, or may not, lead to internal rewards, such as simply feeling good about how one has acted in a particular situation and feeling in sync with one’s personal moral compass and
own conscience). 240
How and when such ex-ante internalization within the second realm
of norm actuation comes about, however, is extremely difficult to ascertain.241 For example, we need to explain how the substance of such
norm internalization is achieved in order to coincide and significantly
overlap with (apparently) some sort of majoritarian default of moral
“rightness” in corporate reality. Furthermore, we need to understand
how such majoritarian default is sufficiently and effectively signaled to
the different marketplaces of firm investors to entice such investors to
make (often sunk) firm-specific investments with confidence. 242 Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, we need to find out how such internalized

238. Cf. Chapman, supra note 183, at 585 (“But the incumbent managers in the
Shleifer and Summers argument are not loyal or trustworthy for instrumental reasons at
all. The simply are loyal in virtue of the actual lives they have lived, and the promises
they have made.”) (emphasis in original) (discussing Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence
Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES
AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (A. Auerbach ed., 1988)); Grossman, supra note 53, at 466
(“Perhaps a better approach is to make directors want to do the right thing.”) (emphasis
in original); Ribstein, Law v. Trust, supra note 227, at 553-54 (“Trusting people cooperate because it is in their nature or because they have been socialized to do it, not because some costly structure has been set up to ensure reliability.”).
239. Cf. Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 612.
240. Cf. Burke & Stets, supra note 26, at 347; Elhauge, supra note 35, at 752 (“pleasurable feelings of virtue, inner peace, or satisfaction”).
241. Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 1728.
242. Gambetta, supra note 85, at 216 (“The problem, therefore, is essentially one of
communication: even if people have perfectly adequate motives for cooperation they
still need to know about each other’s motives and to trust each other, or at least the effectiveness of their motives. It is necessary not only to trust others before acting cooperatively, but also to believe that one is trusted by others.”) (emphasis in original).
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normative majoritarian agenda is exercised consistently over an infinite
continuum of different individual directors, corporate boards, decisional
substances, cultural contexts, and points in time. 243 Only such consistent
and continuous exercise (longa consuetudo) allows any normative majoritarian agenda to sufficiently and efficiently affect absolute directorial
decisionmaking power so that the vast majority of board decisions made
(i.e., the output determinations in the decisional black box described
above) are, at a minimum, perceived as “correct,” “fair” or, at least, “tolerable enough” so that firm participants remain involved and invested
on a going-forward basis. Here, we are eventually talking about (and are
thinking about ways to pre-evaluate) “good agent character” and how
firms select for good agent character and have efficient insight into good
moral character in the first place to select good agents. This, to date, is
at best a mostly unexplained and rather mysterious process. 244
A Taoist 245 or mysticism-based 246 approach to the accountability

243. Cf. Mitchell, Trust, supra note 23, at 190. In this regard, the theory of “groupthink” developed in organizational psychology requires more of our attention. Groupthink has been described as the dynamic process by which group members unconsciously forgo their respective abilities to make realistic and internally validated individual
adaptive decisions for the sake of conformity with, and commitment to, a group mode
of thinking and deciding which will then often morph—for purposes of group cohesion
and collective orientation—into a group esprit de corps and rapport and into what has
been described as “homosocial reproduction.” See, e.g., IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK:
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOS (1982); ROSABETH MOSS
KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 48, 63 (1977) (coining the term “homosocial reproduction”); Marlene A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of
Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233 (2003). See also Cox & Munsinger, supra note
66, at 92-95; Jones, supra note 15, at 139-41; Steven A. Ramirez, The End of Corporate
Governance Law: Optimizing Regulatory Structures for a Race to the Top, 24 YALE J.
ON REG. 313, 340 (2007); Ripken, supra note 33, at 132-33.
244. Cf. Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 3, 8.
245. Cf. Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 606.
246. GILBERT K. CHESTERTON, ORTHODOXY 48 (1908) (“Mysticism keeps men sane.
As long as you have mystery you have health; when you destroy mystery you create
morbidity. The ordinary man has always been sane because the ordinary man has always been a mystic. He has permitted the twilight. He has always had one foot in earth
and the other in fairyland. He has always left himself free to doubt his gods; but (unlike
the agnostic of to-day) free also to believe in them. He has always cared more for truth
than for consistency. If he saw two truths that seemed to contradict each other, he
would take the two truths and the contradiction along with them.”). See also ANTOINE
DE SAINT-EXUPÉRY, THE LITTLE PRINCE 63 (Richard Howard trans., Harcourt 2000)
(1943) (“One sees clearly only with the heart. Anything essential is invisible to the
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conundrum of directorial behavior would probably claim that such
process will always remain unexplained and, thus, mysterious. However, I believe that something more can be done, at least, in principle. Let
us take as an example the protolegal variable that arguably constitutes
the very heart of the fiduciary relationship between corporate directors
and the corporation as an aggregation of factors of production: trust.
Decisional discretion by some over recognized interests of others
requires trust. 247 Much has been written about trust, the central “extralegal” 248 norm of directorial behavior. For example, Lawrence Mitchell,
one of the leading legal scholars on trust and trustworthiness in the
realm of corporate law, 249 has developed a trust model of the firm that is
built on the breach of implicit contracts that embody the good faith expectations of the various firm constituencies. 250 Moreover, Oliver Williamson, in his leading economic model of trust, 251 has famously stated
that “calculative trust is a contradiction in terms” 252 since both terms—
calculativeness and trust—are not only deemed mutually exclusive concepts (at least, on first blush), but “trust,” as a diffuse, mixed-meaning
and, thus, confusing term, is useless to explain economic transactions. 253
According to Williamson, the concept of calculativeness (i.e., economic
actors eliminate the need for trust by calculatively anticipating and allocating risk ex-ante) can instead explain the behavior of economic actors. 254 For Mitchell, extralegal norms like trust are part and parcel of all
human relations (including those of economic, rational-choice actors),
eyes.”).
247. Cf. Epstein, supra note 85, at 9; Mitchell, Fairness, supra note 196, at 430;
Mitchell, Trust, supra note 23, at 188.
248. Cf. Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 615.
249. See Mitchell, Fairness, supra note 196; Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust and the
Overlapping Consensus, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1918 (1994) [hereinafter Mitchell, Overlapping Consensus]; Mitchell, Trust, supra note 23; Mitchell, Trust and Team, supra
note 50, at 870; Mitchell, Norms, supra note 149; Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13.
250. Mitchell, Trust and Team, supra note 50, at 871, 899. See also Mitchell, Fairness, supra note 196; Mitchell, Overlapping Consensus, supra note 249; Mitchell,
Trust, supra note 23; Mitchell, Norms, supra note 149; Mitchell, Trusted, supra note
13. Cf. Wallman, Understanding, supra note 10, at 808 (mentioning “good faith expectations” which employees and other affected communities “were told to trust”).
251. Cf. Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 603.
252. Williamson, Calculativeness, supra note 85, at 463.
253. Id. at 469. See also Epstein, supra note 85, at 10; Posner, supra note 170, at
1699.
254. Williamson, Calculativeness, supra note 85, at 463.
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and those relations are “arranged along a spectrum of affinity” so that
there is “a thread of human empathy even in the most calculating relationships.” 255 As such:
To be trusted is to be held accountable for the trust reposed by the
truster, to be held to a standard of behavior that allows these very
important relationships to form and be sustained, and to be held responsible by social approbation, feelings of failure and guilt, and
sometimes by law if that trust reposed is breached. Perhaps most
importantly, to be trusted is to be told that we are trustworthy. And
to be told that we are trustworthy demands that we behave at a level
256
that reflects that gift.

In other words, trust is a reciprocal arrangement that mutually benefits both sides of the equation (i.e., the exercise results in net gains of
social/reputational capital for both parties). 257 However, the truster and
the trustee must signal to each other their trustworthiness and willingness to actually trust, and then go through with the arrangement and play
their designated roles in a well-behaved manner. 258 However, I am uncertain whether the expectational 259 demand made by a trusting person,
merely based on the fact that I am simply perceived and told to be trustworthy (I might not be or might not want to be), is indeed a “gift” or
whether it is rather a curse. For starters, I do not like to be told things.
In particular, I do not like to be told what I am or am not, or more precisely, what I should be or should not be. I do not know—as a human
being striving for my personal authenticity and autonomy free from any
“trappings” of external validation—whether I even want to be trusted;
whether I want to be held responsible (whatever that means in this context) by “social approbation” and “feelings of failure and guilt.” Why
should I care? Why should I let my moral compass and personal conscience be manipulated260 in that way? I neither like to be shamed nor

255.
256.
257.
258.

Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 608.
Id. at 599.
Cf. Coffee, supra note 177, at 2151; Dent, Race, supra note 212, at 1002.
Cf. Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O’Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1717, 1724 (2006) (“[T]rust requires more than simple cooperation. It requires, in addition, a sense of entitlement to return beneficience.”) (footnote omitted).
259. Cf. Gambetta, supra note 85, at 217 (describing trust as “a particular expectation we have with regard to the likely behaviour of others”).
260. Cf. Stout, Investor Confidence, supra note 51, at 437 (“Experienced policymakers and businesspeople (and certainly experienced con artists) have long known that
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framed. 261
In other words, I believe that, in contrast to the Williamsonian
worldview in which “[c]alculative trust is a contradiction in terms,” 262
calculative trust is rather a generally misunderstood tautology. 263 Trust
and trustworthiness are always calculative. 264 They are designed to deal
with the eternally present Knightian 265 uncertainty of future outcomes. 266
trust is a potent force in explaining and manipulating investor behavior.”) (emphasis
added).
261. Cf. Blair & Stout, Trustworthiness, supra note 5, at 1796 (“In other words, fiduciary duty law works through framing, not shaming.”) (emphasis in original). See
also Ribstein, Law v. Trust, supra note 227, at 566. In this regard, framing is a similar
organizational pressure aimed at invading and affecting individual preferences and behavior as is shaming. Thus, ultimately, it is a manipulative mechanism aimed at weakening (and dumbing down) the collective cognitive functioning of groups by enhancing the unconscious adherence to group norms and assumptions. Cf. Ramirez, supra
note 243, at 340; Ripken, supra note 33, at 133-38.
262. Williamson, Calculativeness, supra note 85, at 463.
263. Cf. Stigler, supra note 171, at 442 (“21. The central argument is not only a tautology, it is false.”).
264. I believe that Lawrence Mitchell reveals as much himself when he says that
“[i]n the absence of trustworthiness, trusting not only would be irrational in a technical
sense—it would be plain stupid.” See Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 599. See also
Mitchell, Trust, supra note 23, at 191 (“Trust derives centrally from our confidence in
the trusted’s intentions, specifically, that the trusted will act in the manner we expect
her to.”). In other words, trusting will only be extended ‘rationally’ if and once the truster, before trusting, has gone through an affirmatively satisfactory, calculative evaluation of whether there is enough ex ante trustworthiness in the person to be trusted. Otherwise, if I trust without this calculative, evaluative basis for trusting, I am acting
irrationally. See also Williamson, Calculativeness, supra note 85, at 479 (explaining
how calculative behavior needs to be suppressed in order to preserve the quality of the
trust relationship and how the decision to suppress calculativeness may itself be calculative, thereby making it impossible to ever achieve pure non-calculative trust). Thus, my
view is the opposite of the Williamsonian approach in that I believe that not calculative
trust but that non-calculative trust is a contradiction in terms.
265. KNIGHT, supra note 3, at 109, 235, 223.
266. Cf. Gambetta, supra note 85, at 218 (“The condition of ignorance or uncertainty about other people’s behaviour is central to the notion of trust.”); McAllister, supra
note 221, at 25 (“Trust enables people to take risks[.]”); Mitchell, Trust, supra note 23,
at 191 (stating that “a major function of trust is to help us to reduce the uncertainty and
complexity of society”). Uncertainty, of course, exists because of the lack of knowledge of what the future will bring, i.e. because of the lack of knowledge of all stochastic variables. See, e.g., Alces, supra note 42, at 241-42; Bainbridge, Primacy, supra
note 12, at 556 n.44; Meurer, supra note 53, at 739; Richter, supra note 5, at 175 n.22.
See also Dooley, supra note 6, at 465 (“If there were no bounded rationality, including
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They control behavior of others to produce preferential outcomes that,
ex-ante, one cannot control (entirely) by oneself. 267 They are selfreferential, autopoietic expectation exercises that always work both
ways and lock both parties into a cohesive, 268 dyadic, 269 and requiting
dance. 270 Why do we do this? Because it, apparently, is too hard for us
human beings in post-capitalist 271 industrial societies to each be (or to, at
least, try to be as much as humanly possible) individually autonomous,
authentic and true to ourselves. 272
no limitations on human foresight or the ability to acquire and process information, individuals could write completely specified contingent contracts.”); Gambetta, supra
note 85, at 218 (“If we were blessed with an unlimited computational ability to map out
all possible contingencies in enforceable contracts, trust would not be a problem.”) (reference omitted).
267. See Gambetta, supra note 85, at 217 (“[T]rust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a
particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another
agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, both before he can monitor
such action (or independently of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in a context in which it affects his own action.”) (emphases in original) (references omitted).
268. Cf. Burke & Stets, supra note 26, at 347 (“We suggest that the processes of establishing and maintaining self-verification contexts, and the positive self-feelings that
result, lead to the development of interpersonal or group cohesiveness in the form of
commitment, emotional attachment, and a collective orientation.”).
269. Id., at 348 (“Self-verification leads to positive self-evaluations and positive
other-evaluations in the form of dyadic trust, and trust facilitates attachment to the other. This attachment should reveal itself not only in commitment to the other but also in
positive feelings for the other and, we anticipate, in a collective orientation to the relationship.”).
270. What I mean by this is that each truster is not only trusting but—
simultaneously—signaling that she is trustworthy of being good at trusting. Likewise,
each trustee is not only signaling that he is trustworthy but—at the same time—also
trusting that the truster will reciprocate and appreciate the trustworthiness made available to her. Each party deals with a complete set of expectations, counter-expectations
and expectation-expectations. Cf. id., at 348; Hill & O’Hara, supra note 258, at 1724;
McAllister, supra note 221, at 25.
271. Cf. Mitchell, Trust and Team, supra note 50, at 870.
272. Cf. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, supra note 227, at 555 (“[Trust] refers to the willingness to make oneself vulnerable to another without costly external constraints.”)
(emphasis added); Stout, Investor Confidence, supra note 51, at 415-16 (arguing that
“rational expectation investors,” i.e., those investors who do not trust but act and invest
on a purely calculative basis, “protect themselves from exploitation by refusing to become vulnerable in the first place”) (emphasis added). In general, I argue, that we do
not appreciate our respective individual (but only perceived) vulnerabilities. There is
no larger perceived vulnerability than our respective individual (and very real) mortality. Thus, trusting is merely an exercise in shadow-boxing—in dealing with the shadows
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In my worldview, trust is double-blind calculativeness. 273 It is as
calculated as rational choice but, perhaps, only feels more dignified and
virtuous since it avoids the paradigm of a cold-blooded, hard-driven
bargain. 274 However, when it is coupled with control exercises about future behavior of other human beings—in particular, when the control
exercises are driven by such powerful corporate incentives as wealth
maximization and control—then trust is calculative from its core to its
very periphery.
Accordingly, trust is just a bargain, albeit on a higher-order level of

of our perceptions of external costs rather than dealing with the internal, and entirely
genuine wealth of our own existence. Accordingly, trust is always futile. It creates
more distance from, rather than brings us closer to, our respective personal reality and
truth.
273. Cf. Williamson, Calculativeness, supra note 85, at 480-81 (explaining that “the
calculative approach can be taken to extremes” and that, for purposes of maintaining its
functionality, calculative behavior sometimes needs to occur subconsciously and needs
to be suppressed in order to preserve the quality of the trust relationship). See also Blair
& Stout, Trustworthiness, supra note 5, at 1797 (“[T]rying to shore up trust behavior by
making it easier for corporate participants to ‘litigate trust’ may produce the counterintuitive result of an increase in the incidence of the untrustworthy behavior.”); id. at
1808-09; Gambetta, supra note 85, at 213-14 (“The unqualified claim that more cooperation than we normally get would be desirable . . . , if preached too extensively, may
even have the effect of making cooperation less attractive.”) (footnote and reference
omitted); Hill & O’Hara, supra note 258, at 1793 (“We think that the window of actual
liability for breaches of the duty of care should remain small. A larger window might
encourage costly and inefficient levels of residual distrust, where directors are overly
motivated to ‘look for everything’ and officers, feeling distrusted, are more apt to behave in an untrustworthy manner.”) (footnote omitted); Jones, supra note 15, at 109
(“[T]he prospect of disproportionate penalties hinder the internalization of appropriate
moral values by corporate leaders.”); Langevoort, supra note 12, at 831 (“When the law
becomes too aggressive, it risks altering the social dynamic of the board in a way that
makes it less effective as a working group.”); Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 606
(“It is almost as if, in a Tao-like way, Williamson believes that naming the reality destroys the relationship.”); Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 18 (“The empirical
evidence suggests that if we place too heavy a burden on [altruistic notions as, for example, the directors’ internalized sense of responsibility], they will crumble under the
weight.”).
274. Cf. Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 600; Ribstein, Law v. Trust, supra note
227, at 563 (“Family members or close friends may eschew calculation of probabilities
as inconsistent with the intimate bond between them.”); Williamson, Calculativeness,
supra note 85, at 486 (stating that personal, i.e., nearly noncalculative, trust “is warranted only for very special personal relations that would be seriously degraded if a calculative orientation were ‘permitted’”).
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abstraction (and, thus, obscuration and obfuscation). 275 Actors that engage in signaling trust and trustworthiness want something from each
other. If I want something from another human being—as an independent, autonomous actor whose actions and inactions I do not control—I
will engage in a calculative exercise to find out about and achieve two
ends: (i) how to get it and (ii) what to give for it. Not “getting” or not
“giving” is no longer part of the calculative equation. 276 Although trust
matters, 277 trust only matters because it pays. 278
275. Cf. Luhmann, Familiarity, supra note 51, at 98 (“Moreover, trust is only possible in a situation where the possible damage may be greater than the advantage you
seek. Otherwise, it would simply be a question of rational calculation and you would
choose your action anyway, because the risks remain within acceptable limits. Trust is
only required if a bad outcome would make you regret your action.”) (reference omitted). Cf. also Lee, supra note 10, at 537.
276. Cf. ARROW, supra note 28, at 23 (“Trust is … extremely efficient; it saves a lot
of trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other people’s word. Unfortunately this is
not a commodity which can be bought very easily. If you have to buy it, you already
have some doubts about what you’ve bought.”). My point is that we should extend this
Arrowian insight to the very basis of trust. Trust is ‘bought’ or ‘contracted’ for. Trust
constitutes an implicit, gap-filling, self-enforcing ‘contract’ because to provide for details ex ante by complete contracting is just “too damn hard.” Trust is a commodity,
only on perhaps a higher plain of complexity, and we should have doubts about what it
is that we are buying and for what ends we are willing to engage in these forms of subtle manipulations of others and selves. See also Williamson, Calculativeness, supra
note 85, at 486 n.136 (“When trust is justified by expectations of positive reciprocal
consequences, it is simply another version of economic exchange.”) (quoting JAMES
MARCH & JOHAN OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS 27 (1989)).
277. Cf. Ben-Ner & Putterman, supra note 196, at 523 (“The need to decide whether
to trust another party is ubiquitous in business dealings.”); Chapman, supra note 183, at
549 (“Trust plays an essential role in all modern economies, and without it, or without
the coordination that is provided by institutional loyalty, even efficient wealthmaximizing corporate contracting can make us all worse off.”); Coffee, supra note 177,
at 2175; Dent, Race, supra note 212, at 1001-02; Hill & O’Hara, supra note 258, at
1723 (“Trust is an essential component of human relationships and a fundamental building block of healthy societies.”); Mitchell, Fairness, supra note 196, at 425 (“Trust is
the glue that binds corporate relationships.”); Mitchell, Trust, supra note 23, at 185
(“Trust is one of the most important institutions binding our society.”); Stout, Investor
Confidence, supra note 51, at 408 (“Investor trust provides the foundation on which the
American securities market has been built. Without investor trust, our market would be
a thin shadow of its present self.”).
278. “The service and the loyalty I owe, In doing it, pays itself.” WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 1 sc. 4. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. See
also Ribstein, Law v. Trust, supra note 227, at 553 (“Trust is a kind of social glue that
allows people to interact at low transactions costs.”) (footnote omitted).
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Trust is only about using each other to maximize one’s own individual utility. 279 Trust pays 280 because—as a calculative, mutually reciprocated, self-enforcing and, thus, autopoietic means designed to deal
with uncertainty once complete contracting becomes impossible or, at
least, impracticable 281—it allows trust parties to achieve their respective
individual, egocentric ends. When trust works well, those individual
ends turn out to be fully complementary. At the same time, a successful
trust arrangement reinforces the calculative exercise of trusting as both
individually and mutually beneficial. 282 Given such reality of trust relationships, it is not “calculative trust,” but its opposite, noncalculative
trust, that is truly oxymoronic, i.e., “a contradiction in terms.” 283
Thus, trust is not a norm, but rather a calculative, manipulative 284
device of controlling the behavior of others (as well as of controlling the
279.
280.
281.

Cf. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, supra note 227, at 560.
And repays; see Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 1728.
Cf. Dent, Race, supra note 212, at 1003; Gambetta, supra note 85, at 218 (“If
we were blessed with an unlimited computational ability to map out all possible contingencies in enforceable contracts, trust would not be a problem.”) (reference omitted);
Richter, supra note 5, at 174-75 (“Under Knighian uncertainty, it is impossible to write
a complete contract that details all possible future contingencies, even if transaction
costs are zero.”) (footnote omitted).
282. Burke & Stets, supra note 26, at 348 (“When another person verifies one’s selfview, the process of trust is activated. The self begins to see the other as predictable
and dependable, and responds by developing trust in, and dependence on, the other. If
the other responds benevolently (is trustworthy), then commitment to the relationship is
fostered.”) (reference omitted).
283. Cf. Williamson, Calculativeness, supra note 85, at 463; id. at 479 (explaining
how the suppression of calculativeness itself may be calculative, thereby making it impossible to ever achieve pure non-calculative trust). In other words, trust only exists
conditionally. It is always conditioned on at least some reciprocation (i.e., some manipulated reaction) by the trustee to the trusting behavior of the truster. Thus, ‘unconditional trust’ (cf. Luhmann, Familiarity, supra note 51, at 94) is similarly oxymoronic or
a contradiction in terms. Compare Ribstein, Law v. Trust, supra note 227, at 556-57
(“Like one who trusts, one who is trustworthy in the sense discussed in this article behaves non-calculatively, and honors his promise even in the absence of constraints such
as repeat dealings.”) (footnote omitted). See also Ben-Ner & Putterman, supra note
196, at 525 (“[W]e suggest that the phenomenon of trusting in commerce is nonetheless
substantially amenable to analysis in terms of self-interested calculation.”); Hill &
O’Hara, supra note 258, at 1727 (“[I]t becomes in practice quite difficult to separate out
calculative from noncalculative trust-relevant behavior.”).
284. See Stout, Investor Confidence, supra note 51, at 437 (“Experienced policymakers and businesspeople (and certainly experienced con artists) have long known that
trust is a potent force in explaining and manipulating investor behavior.”).
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requiting behavior of oneself measured in units of trustworthiness).
Trust is a pure hedge to control for future outcomes in a world of uncertainty 285—for what is supposed to happen in order to make oneself individually (and individually only) better off. However, if trust is only a
procedural device without normative substance other than in its mechanical application,286 then it may be that most, if not all, of the other extralegal “norms” listed above are also mere calculative devices in order to
predict, and manipulate, uncertain future behavior of (economic) actors,
including oneself. In this regard, those protolegal variables rather become (or, more precisely, harbor hidden) protonormative variables.
They are empty 287 enforcers of an a priori normative substance that
(re)creates itself through autopoiesis. Without their embedded protonormative substance, the above “norms” are normatively vacuous.
In summary, legal and economic scholarship has begun to describe
and narrate the phenomenon of normative reactions of directorial decisionmakers. However, we are far from explaining such phenomenon per
se (i.e., from normatively explaining why it happens, such that the genius of our American corporate law288 has stayed away from any enforceable ex-post legal accountability or any ex-ante legal constraints in order to deter or punish directorial shirking). 289
285.
286.

Cf. Mitchell, Trust, supra note 23, at 191.
Cf. Dent, Race, supra note 212, at 1001-02 (“Trust in others is essential to human interaction, especially in dealings too complex for the parties’ rights and duties to
be detailed in writing.”). Thus, trust is a similar device to a ‘contract’ and comes with
the identical functionality of a ‘contract’ and with nothing of normative value beyond
such functionality.
287. In other words: prescriptively neutral.
288. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 1, 151 (1993);
McChesney, supra note 13, at 256. See also Roberta Romano, Competition for State
Corporate Law, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW
364-69 (2002). Cf. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 3. Even though the reference is to
American corporate law, it is often claimed, as part of the so-called “convergence debate,” that such genius of American corporate law is more and more universally accepted. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy, supra note 3, at 45;
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L. J. 439, 439, 468 (2001).
289. Cf. Gambetta, supra note 85, at 217 (“But ‘why should beliefs held by different
individuals (or types of individual) be commonly known? The fact is that our understanding of human psychology … is hopelessly imperfect. In particular, we have little
idea of how individuals actually acquire beliefs’. Among these beliefs, trust – a particular expectation we have with regard to the likely behaviour of others – is of fundamental
importance.”) (quoting from Kenneth Binmore & Partha Dasgupta, Game Theory: A
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VI. CLOSING SKETCHES:
UNCOMMANDED COMMAND WITHOUT PRINCIPLE?
This Article elaborated on a dilemma under the absolute director
primacy model that I have developed 290 and concludes that the dilemma
is more complex and abstract than originally expected. The dilemma is
simply this: the board of directors in a Berle-Means corporation is not
only autocratic, but it can also be totalitarian if, when and where it so
pleases. 291 Directors have complete discretion to make corporate decisions by fiat and without any legal accountability for the substance of
their decisions (as long as there is no implication of self-interest raising
duty of loyalty concerns). Directorial behavior based on unrestricted
power is, therefore, by definition completely opportunistic.
No rational investor would participate in a firm knowing that its
central decisionmaker can always act opportunistically (and, thus, shirk
on performance at random) and, nonetheless, always get away with it.
However, the empirically observable average of directorial behavior

Survey, in ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF GAMES (Kenneth Binmore & Partha Dasgupta
eds. 1986)); Langevoort, supra note 12, at 832 (“Until we discover exactly what directors hear amidst all the noise, we cannot begin to evaluate the wisdom of our bundle of
legal and regulatory strategies touching on questions of boards of directors’ responsibilities.”); Eric Talley, Disclosure Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 2026 (2001) (“We are
still, unfortunately, extremely far from formulating a general, predictive and falsifiable
theory of norms.”); Williamson, supra note 147, at 596 (“[W]e are still very ignorant
about institutions.”).
290. Reich-Graefe, supra note 10.
291. Cf. Blair & Stout, Trustworthiness, supra note 5, at 1791 (“The net result is
that, as a practical matter, a negligent director is more likely to be hit by lightning after
leaving her board meeting than she is to pay damages.”); Jones, supra note 15, at 117
(“Independent directors face an infinitesimal risk of paying personally for damages to
the corporation cause bye their breach of fiduciary duty.”); Mitchell, Trust, supra note
23, at 190 (stating that “directors have largely unlimited power over the corporation and
its affairs”); Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 6 (“The business judgment rule . .
. allows a director who makes even a minimal effort to become ‘informed’ to make
foolhardy decisions all day long, without fear of liability.”); id. at 6-7 (“[I]t is only a
slight exaggeration to suggest that a corporate director is statistically more likely to be
attacked by killer bees than she is to have to ever pay damages for breach of the duty of
care.”). See also Alces, supra note 42, at 242 (“It is dangerous and costly to assume
that fiduciary duties function well in the corporate context. The assumption may give
shareholders a false sense of security or a belief that they are able to discipline management effectively when in fact, because of the very limited nature of corporate governance duties, they are not.”).
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suggests that corporate directors seem to get it reasonably right most of
the time. Firm-specific investments are made—daily and literally millions of times over 292—and with a good measure of predictive accuracy.
I posit that a sound theoretical explanation of this phenomenon (and
dilemma) is still missing from our current corporate governance debate.
Neither current corporate law nor our microtheoretical models of the
firm 293 do (or, logically, can) explain the daily phenomenon of general
investor confidence ex-ante-investment in the face of absent director accountability ex-post-investment294—other than to assume ultimate control by some firm participant’s interests (for example, shareholder value), which is entirely illusory. 295 We really have no good idea yet about
how corporate directors, faced with limitless opportunities (at least, in
principle), will select from a complete set of nonreviewable substantive
options that are available to them pursuant to their absolute, sui generis
decisionmaking power granted by corporate law. Neither do we have a
good idea yet about how corporate directors are incentivized to repeated-

292. For example, the average daily trading volume on the New York Stock Exchange for NYSE-listed companies in 2009 totaled 7,982,926 trading transactions per
diem, comprising an average of 2,179,775,581 shares traded for a total average consideration of $46,670,638,331. Facts & Figures: Interactive Viewer, NYSEDATA.COM,
http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer_edition.asp?mode=table&key=
3002&category=3). See also Blair & Stout, Trustworthiness, supra note 5, at 1737.
293. The main four models in today’s academic discussion can be labeled as “shareholder primacy,” “contractarian,” “team production” and “director primacy.” See, e.g.,
Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy, supra note 3 (discussing shareholderprimacy and director-primacy models); Coates, supra note 10 (discussing teamproduction models); Dent, supra note 10 (discussing team-production and directorprimacy models); Fisch, supra note 10 (discussing shareholder-primacy models); Lee,
supra note 10 (discussing shareholder primacy and team production models); ReichGraefe, supra note 10 (discussing all four models); Verret, supra note 10, at 315-26
(discussing all four models as well as “agency theory” and “progressive corporate law
theory”). For a more general discussion of those firm models, see also Eisenberg, supra
note 10; O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur, supra note 3; Wallman, Understanding, supra
note 10.
294. Cf. Mitchell, Trust, supra note 23, at 191 (“Why would anybody invest money
in a corporation, an institution over which she has no control?”); Stout, Proper Motives,
supra note 12, at 3, 8 (asking why directors “seem to mostly live up to our trust”); id. at
9 (“Rational investors would never cede control of tens of trillions of dollars of assets to
purely self-interested boards, given the tissue-paper thin protection offered by the rules
of fiduciary duty, and the limits of social sanctions.”).
295. Cf. Thomas Lee Hazen, The Corporate Persona, Contract (and Market) Failure, and Moral Values, 69 N.C. L. REV. 273, 274 (1991).
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ly select available options “properly” and “do the right thing.” 296 Maybe
Saint-Exupéry’s advice is indeed true and the essentials do remain “invisible to the eyes.” 297
My attempt at an elaboration of the dilemma under the absolute director primacy model that is the focal point of this Article (and, thus, my
attempt at more visibility and less “blackness” in the current corporate
decisionmaking black box described above) has focused on directorial
moral behavior—the dialectic confrontation of a limitless range of opportunities in the reality of corporate practice with normative directorial
preferences. I argue that normative directorial preferences are controlled
by “protolegal variables.” Those variables constitute all forms of sociocontextual, 298 behavior-oriented and reciprocal 299 normative implications
and foundations of interpersonal cooperation that are not enforceable at
law, but that are, similar to legal imperatives, based on the interplay of
expectations and counter-expectations that underlies social and privateparty ordering. 300
I posit that a theory of protonormative calculativeness (which utilizes the directorial moral psychology as a set of internalized calculative
devices rather than a set of internalized moral norms) may help explain
the requiting stability and cohesion of the corporate venture that is the

296. Cf. Grossman, supra note 53, at 465-66; Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at
1608; Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 9. See also Meurer, supra note 53, at 740
(stating with regard to the problem of unforeseeable contingencies in transaction-costtheory ‘contracting’ that “this begs the questions of how a firm gets managers to be pure
profit maximizers”).
297. ANTOINE DE SAINT-EXUPÉRY, supra note 246, at 63.
298. Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 13.
299. Fehr & Gächter, supra note 49, at 159 (“Reciprocity means that in response to
friendly actions, people are frequently much nicer and much more cooperative than predicted by the self-interest model; conversely, in response to hostile actions they are frequently much more nasty and even brutal.”).
300. LUHMANN, LOVE, supra note 51; LUHMANN, RISK supra note 51; LUHMANN,
SOCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 51; LUHMANN, TRUST AND POWER, supra note 51; Luhmann, Familiarity, supra note 51, at 97 (“You cannot live without forming expectations
with respect to contingent events and you have to neglect, more or less, the possibility
of disappointment. You neglect this because it is a very rare possibility, but also because you do not know what else to do. The alternative is to live in a state of permanent
uncertainty and to withdraw expectations without having anything with which to replace them.”). See also Blair & Stout, Trustworthiness, supra note 5, at 1796; Miller,
supra note 51, at 641; Mitchell, Trust, supra note 23, at 191; Stout, Investor Confidence, supra note 51, at 410-15.
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result of a (real or imagined) reduction of the systemic risk which firm
participants’ sunk investments otherwise logically face at the hands of
“uncommanded commanders,” namely corporate directors with absolute
decisional primacy. In my view, such protonormative calculativeness is
double-blind. Calculativeness exists, but normative actors, such as corporate directors, are unaware that it exists. Indeed, I argue that they
must not be aware of it. They must obscure and obfuscate calculativeness at all cost. 301 Normative actors must be unable to perceive themselves as “calculative actors” and must rather deceive and view themselves as “good moral actors.” Only in this way can preferences solidify
and prevail over opportunities with some predictive accuracy (instead of
the other way around, which, of course, creates our core agency cost
problem and dilemma in corporate governance). I argue that such directorial behavioral preferences, however, only solidify if the normative actors blind themselves (i.e., deceive themselves) and reciprocally reinforce their calculative blindness (for example, through the use of the
trust “mechanism” as discussed above). Were normative actors to become aware of their manipulative reality of obscured, blinded calculativeness (i.e., by confronting themselves with its truth and their own
normative hypocrisy), I posit that they would immediately and irrevocably destroy the essence of their calculative relationship 302 (given that it is

301. Cf. Williamson, Calculativeness, supra note 85, at 479 (explaining how the
suppression of calculativeness itself may be calculative, thereby making it impossible to
ever achieve pure non-calculative trust).
302. Cf. Blair & Stout, Trustworthiness, supra note 5, at 1797 (“Conversely, trying
to shore up trust behavior by making it easier for corporate participants to ‘litigate trust’
may produce the counterintuitive result of an increase in the incidence of the untrustworthy behavior.”); id. at 1808-09; Dent, Race, supra note 212, at 1004; Gambetta, supra note 85, at 213-14 (“The unqualified claim that more cooperation than we normally
get would be desirable . . . , if preached too extensively, may even have the effect of
making cooperation less attractive.”) (footnote and reference omitted); Hill & O’Hara,
supra note 258, at 1793 (“We think that the window of actual liability for breaches of
the duty of care should remain small. A larger window might encourage costly and inefficient levels of residual distrust, where directors are overly motivated to ‘look for
everything’ and officers, feeling distrusted, are more apt to behave in an untrustworthy
manner.”) (footnote omitted); Jones, supra note 15, at 109 (“[T]he prospect of disproportionate penalties hinder the internalization of appropriate moral values by corporate
leaders.”); Langevoort, supra note 12, at 831 (“When the law becomes too aggressive, it
risks altering the social dynamic of the board in a way that makes it less effective as a
working group.”); Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 606; (describing that Oliver E.
Williamson’s economic model of trust may make the point that personal trust only aris-
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a fake) and with it, of course, the predictive utility of their calculativeness. 303
Therefore, protonormative, double-blind calculativeness appears to
be the only visible explanation, to date, of the phenomenon of general
investor confidence ex-ante-investment in the face of absent director accountability ex-post-investment. For the time being, it appears to constitute the only visible, though tentative backstop—thus, the only principle—against abuses of directorial discretion under absolute
decisionmaking primacy, which abuses remain non-approbated in the
legal, market and social contexts. I made the point in my opening
sketches above that something like “hope” (i.e., a “morally rational” expectation extended by firm participants to directors that the latter will
use their respective moral compasses and will get it “right” more often
than not and protect and increase the former’s investment in the firm)
does not appear to be something that we can and should accept as a satisfactory explanation and basis for the daily phenomenon of general investor confidence ex-ante-investment in the face of absent director acFurther inquiry into this
countability ex-post-investment. 304
phenomenon may show that hope—more precisely, double-blind calculative hope—may be all there is to explain the phenomenon.

es in very special and limited occasions in which the existence and awareness of calculativeness and monitoring would destroy such special trust relationship); Stout, Proper
Motives, supra note 12, at 18 (evaluating empirical studies of altruistic behavior derived
from experimental games called ‘social dilemmas’ and stating that “empirical evidence
suggests that if we place too heavy a burden on such altruistic motivations, they will
crumble under the weight”).
303. And, arguably, reciprocity may then often result in brutal opportunism of corporate actors. Cf. Fehr & Gächter, supra note 49, at 159 (“Reciprocity means that in
response to friendly actions, people are frequently much nicer and much more cooperative than predicted by the self-interest model; conversely, in response to hostile actions
they are frequently much more nasty and even brutal.”).
304. Cf. Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 3, 8 (asking why directors “seem to
mostly live up to our trust”); id. at 9 (“Rational investors would never cede control of
tens of trillions of dollars of assets to purely self-interested boards, given the tissuepaper thin protection offered by the rules of fiduciary duty, and the limits of social sanctions.”).

